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Abstract 
 Citizens’ increased access to the internet is transforming political landscapes 
across the globe. The implications for civil society, culture, religion, governmental 
legitimacy and accountability are vast. In nations where one does not typically expect 
“modern” or egalitarian ideals to be prevalent among highly religious and conservative 
populations, those with motivations to unite around socially and culturally taboo causes 
are no longer forced to silently acquiesce and accept the status quo. The internet has 
proven to be an invaluable tool for those aiming to engage in social activism, as it allows 
citizens in highly oppressive authoritarian regimes to covertly mobilize and coordinate 
online protest events (such as hashtag campaigns, proclamations via social media, signing 
of petitions, and even DDoS attacks) without the fear of repression. 
 What catalyzes lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer/questioning 
(LGBTQ) equality movements in authoritarian regimes, specifically with respect to the 
Middle East and North African region? This thesis argues that gay rights movements are 
more likely to emerge in politically repressive, more conservative states when new 
political opportunities—namely access to the internet for purposes of political 
organization—become available. This master’s thesis identifies why LGBTQ movements 
emerged in Morocco and Algeria, but not in Tunisia until after it underwent 
democratization. These states will be analyzed in order to gauge the strength of their 
LGBTQ rights movements and, most importantly, to identify which variables most 
cogently explain their existence altogether.  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Glossary !
Cisgender - Is an individual whose birth sex correlates with their prescribed gender. In  
 essence it is an individual that does not identify as transgender or agender. 
Coming Out - The process by which an individual publicly reveals a fundamental  
 component of their identity (e.g. sexual, gender, religious, secular, feminist, etc.).  
Gay Community - Though this has homosexual connotations, it is typically used as an  
 umbrella term that is inclusive of the collective LGBTQ community, including  
 transgender individuals, asexual individuals, pansexuals, intersex persons, and  
 even straight allies. 
Gender - Is different from sex in that sex refers to one’s physiological composition,  
 whereas gender is typically the expression of masculine, feminine, or neither of  
 those two characteristics. Descriptively, men usually choose to express their  
 gender by being masculine while women express it by being more feminine.  
 Though this may be a prevalent cultural norm, it is purely stereotypical. Many  
 individuals deviate from these traditional gender roles, hence the need for   
 descriptive terms such as “tom boy,” for example. 
Gender Identity - Refers to how individuals express their gender or label themselves. 
Gender Minority - Is an individual or group of individuals that are not cisgender; that is, 
 their birth sex does not match their gender (see Transgender definition). 
Intersectionality - Is when one person has multiple identities. For example, an   
 individual may be a member of multiple communities (e.g. gay woman of color,  
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 straight cisgender secular man, or Islamic feminist). The labels most individuals  
 identify with are not mutually exclusive. 
LGBTQ - An acronym referring to the aggregate community of sexual and gender  
 minorities; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer/questioning individuals.  
 Several variants are possible such as ‘LGBTI’	  or ‘LGBTP’	  to include intersex  
 and pansexual individuals. 
MENA - Is an acronym that refers to states within the Middle East and North African  
 region. It is also commonly referred to as the “Arab world.”	   
Non-Binary Gender Identity - Is a gender identity that is not associated with the male  
 or female sex. A non-binary gender identity may incorporate characteristics from  
 both the male and female genders or may deviate from both entirely. It is a gender 
 identity that is more flexible and not subject to normative preconceptions of  
 the binary gender system. 
Sexual Minority - Is an individual that is attracted to the same sex or gender, is not  
 attracted to binary genders, or does not have a sexual orientation altogether. 
Transgender - A person that identifies as a gender not correlated with their birth sex.  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Chapter 1 
The Emergence of LGBTQ Movements in the MENA !!!!!!!!!!
 Regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have dismal reputations 
internationally for authoritarianism and lack of political reform. Overt corruption, 
restrictions on civil liberties, and gross violations of human rights are commonplace in 
the region. These aspects of authoritarian governance are merely a snapshot of an 
exhaustive catalog of problems that hinder regional peace and stability, as societal issues 
such as sectarian violence, political cleavages, terrorism, and widespread religious 
fundamentalism also contributes to much of the turmoil that plagues these states. Despite 
the dismal political context, citizens in MENA countries appear remarkably happy. The 
World Values Survey (2010-2014, V10) illustrates that an average of 23.9% of 
respondents in the region claim to be “very happy”	  and an average of 52.9%—a majority
—assert they are “rather happy”	  (compared to 36.1% and 53.5% in the United States, 
respectively).  The level of happiness of a populace is a good indication that citizens do 1
not feel their political situation is hopeless. Citizens in the MENA region are becoming 
 States and territories included in this study are Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Palestine, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 1
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and for comparative reasons, the United States 
(see World Values Survey 2010-2014, V10).
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increasingly politically active even under heavily repressive regimes that attempt to 
violently stifle demonstrations.  
 In 2011 citizens in the MENA, from the Sahrawi people in the Western Sahara to 
the citizens of Saudi Arabia, mobilized in protests. Though some regimes—primarily 
monarchical ones—proved to be quite resilient, the Arab spring lead to the overthrow of 
several autocratic dictators: Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Muammar Gaddafi in 
Libya, and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. What once seemed unfathomable had finally 
occurred. These events raise questions about what catalyzed unprecedented social 
mobilization. Many political scientists contend that technological growth, specifically 
higher levels of internet penetration, the proliferation of smartphones, and increased 
access to satellite television channels such as Al Jazeera has fostered conditions that 
allowed the Arab spring to occur (Lust 2013; Lynch 2012; Hussain & Howard 2013). 
Lust argues that the internet was a key tool for political mobilization (2013, 283). The 
internet could also trigger a plethora of political consequences, including the emergence 
of movements for socially and culturally taboo causes that would not otherwise exist 
without it. 
 One of the potential upshots of greater access to the internet is the materialization 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer/questioning (LGBTQ) equality 
movements throughout the region within the last decade. The strength and overall 
existence of these movements, however, is not consistent in every state. For example, 
Morocco and Algeria, two socially conservative and politically repressive states, both 
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have sizable gay rights movements, but the Moroccan LGBTQ movement differs in that 
it is both stronger than Algeria’s and has existed longer. In Tunisia, a more socially liberal 
state, LGBTQ activism was nonexistent until it underwent democratization. Why did 
members of the LGBTQ community become politically active in two socially 
conservative authoritarian states (Morocco and Algeria), but not in Tunisia, a more open-
minded, secular, and socially liberal authoritarian state?  
 Theoretically, one should expect to find a more robust LGBTQ movement in 
Tunisia seeing as how social conservatism is less prevalent there. Issues related to gender 
equality, alcohol consumption, and secularity are much less controversial in Tunisia in 
comparison with Morocco and Algeria, but in spite of this fact Tunisia is the last of these 
three states to witness the emergence of a gay rights movement. What factor explains 
variation in the size, strength, time of arrival, and, most importantly, the overall existence 
of LGBTQ movements between these three relatively similar states? Solving this puzzle 
will yield an answer to an even broader question: what catalyzes LGBTQ movements in 
politically repressive authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa? 
 My argument is that the advent of new political opportunities (in this case, 
expanded internet access and internet freedom) explains why gay rights movements are 
able to emerge in authoritarian regimes. This argument hinges on my findings from 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Variation in the strength and existence of LGBTQ 
movements in these three cases can be attributed to varying degrees of access to the 
internet and internet freedom in each state. The internet is a crucial resource to gay rights 
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activists in the MENA, therefore limitations on internet access and internet freedom will 
inhibit their ability to engage in activism. This claim substantiates the resource 
mobilization school of thought.  
 This implies that restraints of dictatorial and oppressive governments may no 
longer be able to hold back political change. Due to citizens’ increased access to the 
internet, advocates for gay rights and other “postmaterialist” causes are able to forge 
movements that could potentially gain ascendency in the coming decades now that they 
have the ability to discretely mobilize and collude with like-minded citizens to 
anonymously petition their governments for a redress of grievances. However, even with 
the presence of new political opportunities, this type of activism in the MENA region 
runs contrary to our current theoretical understandings of social movements and why they 
emerge in the first place.  
The Rise of Postmaterialism in the Middle East & North Africa 
 Many MENA citizens are socioeconomically disadvantaged, therefore one could 
logically deduce that they will be more inclined to adopt political orientations tailored to 
their physical (material) well-being as opposed to their social status (postmaterial). To 
engage in activism for the latter cause would imply its participants hold postmaterialist 
values. Postmaterialism is defined as a “value orientation that emphasizes self-expression 
and quality of life over economic and physical security”	  (Encyclopedia Britannica 2008). 
The concept of postmaterialism was developed by Inglehart (1977) who postulates that 
individuals have a hierarchy of values. He states, 
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The values of Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming 
emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis 
on the quality of life. […] People tend to be more concerned with immediate 
needs or threats than with things that seem remote or nonthreatening. Thus a 
desire for beauty may be more or less universal, but hungry people are more 
likely to seek food than aesthetic satisfaction (Ibid 1990, 5). !
This indicates states who have not advanced industrially and/or those in which the 
physical vulnerability of their citizens is high  will be unlikely to foster political 2
environments that are conducive to more “modern” or egalitarian views on matters such 
as civil rights and social equity. 
 In theory, values that facilitate the emergence of such causes should not be 
prevalent—or exist at all—in the MENA region according to existing sociological and 
political science concepts such as modernization theory, but that is not the case. The mere 
existence of LGBTQ activism suggests that egalitarian, socially liberal, and modern 
views are held by some. The World Values Survey (2010-2014, Y002) measures 
postmaterialism in the MENA region using 4-item inter-related questions in order to 
gauge values.  It found that a majority of citizens in many MENA states hold mixed 3
material/postmaterialist values, and an average of 5.3% of citizens mostly embrace 
postmaterialist values (see Table 1.1). This is not surprising when accounting for the 
recent surge of LGBTQ activism in the region. 
 This is perhaps due to territorial disputes (such as the Arab-Israeli territorial dispute) or high levels of 2
state-sponsored violence or repression in authoritarian regimes.
 It should be noted that the methodology for this particular question is not available for this variable, but 3
the World Values Survey is a reputable organization that is cited with regularity in academia. Still, for 
purposes of this discussion, it would prove beneficial to know how postmaterialism is measured, but the 
point of bringing this up is merely for illustrative purposes to show that these values do exist in the MENA, 
albeit to a small degree.
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Table 1.1: Postmaterialist Values in the MENA Region
Note: Percentages in parentheses indicate mixed postmaterialist and materialist values. 
Source: World Values Survey (2010-2014, Y002). !
 Postmaterialist causes are, in effect, those wherein the primary political objective 
is to eliminate conditions that diminish the overall quality of living for particular citizens 
(Ibid). These causes will typically be related to social equality and may include gay and 
transgender rights, atheist, agnostic, areligious, anti-theist, and deist (AAAAD)  rights, 4
indigenous people’s rights, and racial/ethnic minorities’ rights movements. These 
examples do not encompass the totality of possible movements for postmaterialist causes, 
but instead are part of a broader range of postmaterialist issues. Many individuals assume 
these types of movements, especially those advocating for LGBTQ rights, do not exist in 
conservative, autocratic regimes seeing that they are widely regarded as “taboo” or 
“haram” and are too controversial to attain political clout, but the recent materialization 
of LGBTQ rights movements in the MENA forces introspection within the social science 
community since these movements do exist; however, the character of these movements 
differs from their Western counterparts. 
!
Algeria Bahrain Cyprus Palestine Iraq Jordan Lebanon
5.1% 
(44.8%)
20.2% 
(60.5%)
5.8% 
(51%)
5.6% 
(45.8%)
3.5% 
(52.4%)
2.6% 
(37.8%)
7.7% 
(55.2%)
Libya Morocco Qatar Tunisia Turkey Egypt Yemen
4.2% 
(63%)
2.9% 
(42.4%)
4.7% 
(53%)
.9% 
(25.6%)
10.7% 
(53.3%)
1.1% 
(36.6%)
.9% 
(28.9%)
 While the terms ‘atheist’ and ‘areligious’ may sound redundant, they are differentiated by the fact that 4
atheism is the belief that a god does not exist whereas an areligious individual may believe a god exists, but 
does not subscribe to a particular religion.
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Characteristics of Gay Rights Movements in the MENA 
 The first, and perhaps most significant, difference between Western gay rights 
movements and those which exist in the global South is short-term goals. In the West, 
LGBTQ activists’	  short term goals may be full marriage equality and federal anti-
discrimination legislation to protect their community from employment discrimination 
and/or societal prejudice. Their long-term goals will be broader and encapsulate full legal 
and societal equality. Conversely, the goals of gay rights activists in the MENA region 
may ultimately coincide with Western LGBTQ activists, but they fundamentally differ in 
one important respect: Western activists possess goals that cannot be feasibly achieved by 
activists in the MENA. A short-term goal for LGBTQ activists in many MENA countries 
is the amelioration of governmental persecution. In contrast, a common long-term goal is 
full legal recognition of one’s right to identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender 
and practice homosexuality or express one’s gender identity freely.  
 These groups typically establish goals by coalescing around legal and social 
matters that are most culpable in the perpetuation of their collective marginalization. 
Given that the mere act of homosexuality is legally prohibited in most MENA states , 5
decriminalization is a common goal for most gay rights activists in the region. This 
criteria for goal attainment is comparable for Western activists, but they are not reluctant 
to demand sweeping reform. This is a luxury that is afforded to them for living in a 
democracy. These differences are also dependent on the fact that Western activists have 
 See Chapter 2, Table 2.1.5
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prodigious movements that have persisted for decades, and as a result, they have been 
able to gain considerable ground in many countries and are now in a position to ask for 
full recognition of their rights. This is not the case for many movements for 
postmaterialist causes in the MENA, especially when it comes to the issue of gay rights. 
LGBTQ equality movements in the MENA are still in the early stages of development; 
but regardless, their growth has been appreciable.  
 While Middle Eastern and North African LGBTQ movements have seen an 
increase in numbers and have become more organized, they have not made much political 
or social progress. The Western LGBTQ community has been successful in part due to its 
ability to gain support from heterosexual and cisgender  allies—a tactic very much in line 6
with African American civil rights activists who fought for desegregation in the ‘60s by 
drawing support from white political allies. 
 Gay rights movements in the MENA region have diminished standards and lower 
expectations in comparison to their Western counterparts for the fact that the prospect of 
legal marriage equality—let alone the prospect of legalizing homosexuality—is currently 
inconceivable to them. This forces MENA activists to adjust their expectations to match 
short and long-term goals that are actually feasible. Putnam (1988) discusses the notion 
of a “win-set,”	  which is a concept from the field of international relations that describes 
how the preferences of a state’s domestic constituents establish the parameters of an 
international agreement. He writes, “[t]he larger the win-set, the more easily he [the chief 
 Refer to “Cisgender” in the Glossary for the definition of this identity.6
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negotiator acting on behalf of the state] can conclude an agreement, but also the weaker 
his bargaining position vis-à-vis the other negotiator”	  (450). While this view is prominent 
in the game theory research methodology—which is mostly utilized for analyzing 
strategic interactions between international entities—the concept of win-sets is useful if 
we extrapolate it to the interaction between social activists and governments.  
 One can expect LGBTQ movements in the MENA to have very large win-sets 
because they will be willing to except any concession from the government in order to 
improve their social situation even if it is unsatisfactory. Their win-set is large because 
they lack negotiating power. Groups do not typically shrink their win-sets until they attain 
political power, which is adjoined to the level of bargaining power they possess. A group 
with a small win-set will not be appeased by a piece of legislation that, for instance, 
prohibits discrimination against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, but not transgender 
individuals. Their win-set is small because the list of demands they will willingly accept 
is shorter. In contrast, groups with larger win-sets are easier to appease since they have a 
large list of policy concessions that will satisfy them since nearly anything will qualify as 
a win. Contrarily, the government (i.e. their chief opponent) will have a microscopic win-
set for the fact that MENA governments will forego negotiations altogether as highly 
disliked and disadvantaged groups do not yet pose a threat to the legitimacy of many 
authoritarian governments. Seeing as how Western LGBTQ activists have substantial 
social and political power in the form of lobbying, their respective governments will be 
more inclined to concede to their demands for the fact that they pose a direct threat to 
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state legitimacy. Victory may be unattainable in the foreseeable future for LGBTQ rights 
activists in the MENA, but this daunting fact has not kept them from trying. 
 Amidst high costs and a low payoff, there has been a surge in acts of civil 
disobedience among all types of postmaterialist activists in even the most repressive 
totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. A Saudi Arabian atheist activist, Raif Badawi, 
posted an online statement advocating free speech for atheists in spite of the fact that the 
ensuing penalty for doing so would be severe (Hubbard 2015). Additionally, on the 
International Day Against Homophobia members of the LGBTQ community in Tehran 
uploaded photographs of themselves with rainbow flags and signs reading “no to 
homophobia”	  to Joopea, a popular social networking website in Iran (Fisher 2012). In 
Egypt, in an act of protest, eight men uploaded a video to YouTube of themselves 
attending and taking part in a wedding ceremony between a same-sex couple in Nile 
(Kingsley 2014). One thing these instances of activism all have in common is that they 
occur through a proxy: the internet.  
 Political scientists and sociologists must contemplate whether these occurrences 
of online activism are merely isolated, insignificant, and spurious or rather, that they are 
occurring due to the arrival of a new political opportunity that was not previously 
available. I do not believe these instances of activism are benign. Quite contrarily, I 
contend that they signify the initiation of new social movements. Identification of the 
cause(s) of these new movements will be fruitful for future social science research. The 
type of postmaterialist movement that is most appropriate for an evaluation is LGBTQ 
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rights movements for two reasons: (a) they are the most prevalent of all new movements 
to proliferate in the region, and (b) their persistent growth and longevity  makes them 7
easier to measure. 
Research Question & Forecasting Arguments 
 Why do LGBTQ movements emerge in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East 
and North Africa? This thesis argues that gay rights movements are more likely to emerge 
in conservative authoritarian regimes when new political opportunities—namely access 
to the internet for purposes of political organization—become available. In light of the 
recent emergence of postmaterialist movements in the MENA, this graduate thesis 
examines LGBTQ movements in three such cases: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The 
following chapter details the low social status of the aggregate LGBTQ community in the 
MENA region. Chapter 3 outlines the strength of LGBTQ movements in Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia. Chapter 4 provides a literature review of competing theoretical 
explanations as well as arguments outlining what causes new social movements to arise. 
Chapter 5 introduces hypotheses that explain which factor(s) catalyze gay rights activism 
in authoritarian regimes. 
 In the sixth chapter I test my hypotheses by utilizing a most similar systems 
research design (MSSD) methodology with three relatively similar case studies: 
Morocco, Algeria, and pre/post-revolutionary Tunisia. Both Morocco and Algeria are 
authoritarian states that have fairly large LGBTQ movements, but a gay rights movement 
 What I mean by longevity is that these movements have not dissipated over time. Instead, they have all 7
grown since materialization and have yet to disband.
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did not materialize in Tunisia until it democratized in spite of the fact that it is much more 
socially liberal in comparison to the two former states mentioned. I argue that variation 
between the strength and existence of LGBTQ movements in these three states is caused 
by varying degrees of access to the internet. Moroccans and Algerians had more internet 
freedom in comparison to Tunisians, hence the reason why gay rights activism did not 
emerge in Tunisia until after democratization, which is when restrictions on the internet 
were abolished. I also argue that Morocco’s LGBTQ movement is slightly larger than 
Algeria’s despite comparable levels of internet freedom because more Moroccans have 
access to the internet than Algerians.  
 Overall, it will be demonstrated that an underlying level of internet freedom is a 
necessary prerequisite for this type of activism to emerge. The degree to which a 
vulnerable group is able to bypass internet restrictions to collude with other activists is a 
significant determinant for a movement’s success and existence. If a government is too 
repressive and aims to stymie any and all types of political activism, a movement may not 
be able to flourish even if it has adequate access to the internet. This will be detailed 
more thoroughly in Chapter 7, where I will review the overall findings of this thesis, its 
applicability to other movements for postmaterialist causes, and implications it has on 
social movement research. 
Rethinking Activism 
 Before proceeding it will be necessary to elaborate on what is meant by “online 
activism” in order to sufficiently make the case that it should be categorized into 
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traditional conceptions of activism and social movements. A social movement is a 
phenomenon whereby citizens with like-minded interests align and engage in contentious 
politics by confronting “elites, authorities, and opponents” in order to change the legal 
and social status quo (Tarrow 2011, 6). Mass protests, boycotts, and various types of 
strikes are typically associated with existing notions of activism, but online activism is 
becoming equally instrumental to protesters of all stripes. In the MENA region, gay rights 
activism occurs almost exclusively through the internet, thus making it seemingly 
amorphous. However, several types of tactics are easily identifiable and have proven to 
be quite effective to boot. There is a diverse array of methods employed by online 
activists, ranging from political declarations via social media, signing of online petitions, 
coordinated “hashtag” campaigns, and even DDoS attacks on government websites. 
Dismissing this realm of activism is problematic since the internet is the newest frontier 
for political activism, and as a result, it will allow us to acquire key insight into the 
emergence of new social movements of the 21st century. For this to be possible, our 
conceptions of what constitutes social movements must evolve to accommodate it, 
especially if we are going to measure new types of social movements in authoritarian 
regimes. 
 Bayat (2005) calls for “a more fluid and fragmented vision of social movements” 
by “attempting to present an angle which might help account for complexities” (893). I 
also hold this view. Though the chief method in which LGBTQ activism occurs in the 
MENA (via online) is admittedly unorthodox, the dawn of the technological era requires 
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us to update our preconceived notions of what constitutes “activism” or a “social 
movement” because LGBTQ activism in most MENA states—for the time being—is 
inextricably linked to the internet.  Bayat writes, “Given the fragmented nature of 8
contemporary social movements, […] a plausible narrative would take account of the 
heterogenous layers of perceptions, discourses and practices within a given 
movement” (905). Following this logic, online activism should be incorporated into our 
discussion of social movements. 
 Seeing as how the internet is a launching point for gay rights movements in the 
MENA, it is beneficial to differentiate between different ‘tiers’	  of activism and 
hierarchically arrange these movements by size and type before proceeding. 
Categorization of online activism into different tiers is necessary in order to distinguish 
between varying levels of strength in movements and also to account for various forms of 
online political protests that become more coordinated and complex as movements grow. 
Online activism should be mapped onto a spectrum and cannot be arbitrarily 
dichotomized. In total there are four tiers that outline and define the parameters of 
activism that take place under authoritarian regimes on the internet (see Table 1.2). As the 
size and strength of these movements grow they will advance to the next subsequent tier.  
 States that encompass the lowest level of online activism (titled ‘Tier 1’) contains 
minimal amounts of isolated incidents of civil disobedience and instances of activism that 
are typically sporadic and not necessarily catalyzed by a particular causal mechanism. 
 This will be addressed in the following chapters.8
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This may include occasional proclamations on social media of one’s sexual, secular, or 
gender identity. Due to the improbability of such events, they may attract significant 
amounts of domestic and/or international attention, but not enough to warrant political 
mobilization amongst the aggregate group. This includes the establishment of some 
advocacy-oriented pages on social media, but most of which will be insufficient at 
drawing in much attention. These instances are likely rare and isolated due to heavy 
censorship on the internet and the repressive nature of a government. 
 Tier 2 activism is primarily done through social media, but these acts garner a 
sufficient amount of domestic attention and include “hashtag”	  campaigns whereby 
activists get a specific message to trend or create advocacy-based social media accounts 
and websites that center around a message of equality. Tier 2 movements are moderately 
organized. Some coordination is involved in the execution of these campaigns. It is 
important to factor in the level of attention that online activism gets for the fact that it 
will contribute to the said group’s level of clout and ultimately help them muster much 
needed public awareness. Tier 2 movements are able to more freely organize due to 
either: (a) increased levels of internet freedom, or (b) the ability to bypass governmental 
restrictions in states with lower levels of internet freedom, as is the case in some MENA 
states. The LGBTQ movement in Iran is able to thrive because activists are able to 
circumvent governmental firewalls by using a variety of popular software applications 
(Lee 2013). 
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Table 1.2: Four Tiers of Online Activism in Authoritarian Regimes 
!
 When a group’s movement has become large and successful enough to qualify 
into Tier 3, the movement has become more united and has transcended the internet in 
some ways. At this point the activism has lead to the proliferation of more formal 
organizations that are headquartered in less repressive countries. Tier 3 movements also 
witness the creation of multiple informal online organizations and even magazines (that 
are either available online or distributed furtively). Most importantly, Tier 3 activists have 
attained support from some prominent domestic and international allies such as 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4
Isolated Instances of 
Online Civil 
Disobedience !
Individual 
Advocacy-Based 
Facebook Pages or 
Twitter Accounts !
Coordination of 
Social Media 
Campaigns (e.g. 
“Hashtag” 
Campaigns) !
Emergence of Some 
Informal Online 
Organizations !
Mobilization 
Among the 
Collective Group !
Ability to Garner 
Moderate Amounts 
of Attention for the 
Cause
Many Informal 
Organizations 
Proliferate !
Several Formal 
Advocacy or 
Outreach-Based 
Organizations 
Emerge Outside of 
the Movement’s 
Home State !
Group May Have Its 
Own Magazine !
Group Has Gained 
Both Domestic and 
International Allies 
to Speak on Its 
Behalf
Tier 3 Tactics 
Remain Constant, 
but Group has Now 
Attained Political 
Power !
Group has Co-
Opted Politicians 
and/or Political 
Parties !
Group Now Poses a 
Threat to the State’s 
Legitimacy !
Group is Able to 
Pressure 
Governments to 
Grant Some Policy 
Concessions !
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celebrities or nongovernmental organizations. It is unlikely that a movement can advance 
to Tier 3 unless a considerable level of internet freedom is granted to citizens. 
 Once a movement has advanced to Tier 4 not much of the tactics and mobilization 
methods have changed from tier 3, but the group has, at this point, garnered a sufficient 
quantity of political power and now has the capacity to influence policy either by 
themselves or by procuring/co-opting support from powerful political interests such as 
state oligarchs, politicians, political parties, and/or wealthy corporations. Tier 4 
movements have the capacity to challenge their state’s legitimacy, so the internet is no 
longer essential for the movement’s existence. As movements progress to higher tiers 
their win-sets can be expected to decrease, and conversely, the government’s win-set is 
expected to increase for the fact that the said group in question will pose a larger threat to 
the social status quo at higher tiers. Tier 4 movements are not common in the MENA, as 
it requires a regime to be fairly liberalized, if not nominally democratic. This framework 
is designed to encompass online activism in all authoritarian regimes, so it may also be 
utilized outside of the MENA region and will be particularly applicable to Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Categorization of these groups into tiers should not detract from the fact that 
postmaterialist activism in authoritarian regimes must be measured on a spectrum. While 
Moroccan and Algerian LGBTQ activists, for example, both qualify into Tier 3, 
Moroccan activists have progressed further towards the fourth tier than Algerian 
activists . 9
 See Chapter 3, Table 3.19
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Chapter 2 
The Social Status of Sexual & Gender Minorities !!!!!!!!!!
  Though gay rights movements materialized in Morocco and Algeria, but not in 
Tunisia until after its regime change, this should not imply there was not a need for 
LGBTQ activism in Tunisia. In fact, there is a lack of legal and social equality for gay, 
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people in every state in the MENA region, thus making 
political mobilization a necessity. Members of the LGBTQ community in the Middle East 
and North Africa are quite possibly more vulnerable and susceptible to prejudice than 
anywhere else in the world. They are subjected to two forms of discrimination: state-
sponsored legal persecution and societal marginalization. Out of twenty-two MENA 
states and territories  homosexuality is only legal in five ; male homosexuality is legally  10 11
prohibited in sixteen of them , whereas female homosexuality is illegal in thirteen 12
!
 The states and territories examined are Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 10
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, U.A.E. and Yemen. Even though this thesis primarily examines gay rights activism in authoritarian 
regimes, it will be beneficial to include democratic states such as Israel and Turkey for comparative 
reasons.
 Homosexuality is legal in Bahrain, Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, and Turkey (see BBC 2014).11
 Male homosexuality is illegal in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the 12
Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, U.A.E. and Yemen (Itaborahy and Zhu 2014).
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Table 2.1: The Legality of Homosexuality in the Middle East and North Africa 
Source: Itaborahy and Zhu 2014; BBC 2014. !
states , although it should be noted that laws regarding female homosexuality are 13
ambiguous in three states  (Itaborahy and Zhu 2014; BBC 2014). While Egypt has not 14
technically criminalized homosexuality, it prosecutes the LGBTQ community under an 
anti-debauchery clause, therefore it is reasonable to designate the status of homosexuality 
as illegal there (Lee and Sirgany 2015). The penalty for violating anti-homosexuality 
laws in the MENA ranges from fines to imprisonment and even death in some states. 
Homosexuality is punishable by death in seven states in the world; however, four of those 
states (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Mauritania) are in the MENA (BBC 2014) .  15
Legal Legal (Women Only) Illegal Punishable By Death
Bahrain 
Cyprus 
Israel 
Jordan 
Turkey
Egypt 
Iraq 
Palestine 
Tunisia 
Algeria 
Iran 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Syria 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Yemen
Iran 
Mauritania 
Saudi Arabia 
Yemen
 Female homosexuality is illegal in Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, 13
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, U.A.E. and Yemen (Ibid [see citation in footnote 11]).
 States in which laws regarding female homosexuality are “unclear” are Egypt and Iraq according to 14
Itaborahy and Zhu (2014). It should, however, be noted that BBC (2014) claims both male and female 
homosexuality is legal in Iraq.
 The other three states where homosexuality is punishable by death is Nigeria, Sudan, and Somalia (BBC 15
2014). 
!20
 With respect to gender identity—although information on legal framework is 
sparse—only three states in the MENA region currently allow individuals to undergo sex 
reassignment surgery: Israel, Turkey, and Iran (TGEU 2014a; Oldershausen 2012). 
Although sex reassignment surgery is prohibited in Cyprus, they have codified anti-
discrimination measures for transgender individuals. Besides Israel it is unknown 
whether any other state in the region offers protection against discrimination based on 
gender identity (TGEU 2014a). Additionally, it appears as though every state in the 
region legally excludes non-binary gender identities  including Turkey and Israel (TGEU 16
2014b). Under Egyptian law it is legal to prosecute individuals with an androgynous 
gender, an alternative gender, or for having no gender identity (Ibid). The extent to which 
other states have legally codified prosecutorial discretion based on deviations from the 
binary gender system is unknown.  
 Even upon the repeal of statutes that disproportionately disadvantage members of 
the LGBTQ community, the climate will not necessarily become less toxic. In Iran, 
Ayatollah Khomeini—a sworn enemy to gay men and women—is a staunch advocate for 
transgender rights (Tait 2005). Zarindast and Hashemi (2012) reports that the regime 
legally mandates insurance companies to cover the entire cost of sexual reassignment 
surgery (SRS), but in spite of this fact transgender individuals still encounter a gratuitous 
amount of societal discrimination and are frequently perceived to be cross dressing 
(Dehghan 2012). In the case of Iraq societal discrimination may have actually increased 
 See “Non-Binary Gender Identity” and “Gender Identity” in Glossary for definitions.16
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upon legalization of homosexuality. Instances of violence against the LGBTQ community 
in Iraq have surged since it became legalized in 2003 (Alizadeh 2014). This includes 
violence perpetuated by the Islamic State (also commonly referred to as ‘ISIS’ or ‘ISIL’), 
a terrorist organization that has reportedly thrown gay men off of buildings in Mosul 
(Damon and Bilginsoy 2015).  
 There is a strong social stigma attached to sexual and gender deviation in every 
state in the region, but some states stand out when it comes to discrimination. Turkey has 
the eighth highest rate of recorded murders against transgender people in the world with a 
total of twenty-three instances of homicide occurring between 2008 and 2011 (TGEU 
2012). One can also surmise that bias would likely increase due to intersectionality  of 17
identities (i.e. an individual belonging to two or more types of minority groups). 
 From a sociopolitical perspective, there is a dearth of egalitarianism with respect 
to the issue of homosexuality in the region overall. In order to evaluate attitudes towards 
homosexuality, Pew Research Center (2013) conducted a poll with an average sample 
size of 962 respondents from seven MENA states and territories  and found that, with 18
the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, the MENA region is the least tolerant of 
homosexuality . Feelings towards homosexuality are gauged with a 3-point ordinal level 19
variable utilizing the Likert scale. The frequency distribution indicates a strong aversion 
 See “Intersectionality” in Glossary for definition.17
 States included in the study are Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, the Palestinian territories, Egypt, Jordan, and 18
Tunisia.
 It should be noted that this dataset contains other states, but the MENA region is singled out in this 19
discussion in order to determine attitudes towards homosexuality in the region.
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towards the notion of homosexuality; 47% of Israelis, 78% of Turks, 80% of Lebanese, 
93% of Palestinians, 94% of Tunisians, 95% of Egyptians, and 97% of Jordanians believe 
society should not accept homosexuality (Ibid). With a mean of 83%, median of 93%, 
and approximate standard deviation of 17 (8 when excluding Israel) it is clear that 
attitudes towards homosexuality are generally negative . When controlling for nominal-20
level variables such as age there is not much variation. An increase in age typically leads 
to a decrease in tolerance for homosexuality—this is the case in many regions such as 
Latin America, North America, and Europe—but Lebanon is the only state in the region 
where support amongst younger generations is much stronger than older generations  21
(Pew Research Center 2013).  
 These results remain consistent with other datasets. The World Values Survey 
(2010-2014) measured the justifiability of homosexuality with a 10-point interval-level 
variable with sample sizes ranging from 1,000 to 2,131 respondents (with a mode of 
1,200) and found that an average of 68.0% of MENA citizens from thirteen states  22
believe homosexuality is never justifiable (V203). In this dataset the most conservative 
responses came from Qatar, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco (with 91.7%, 87.1%, 85.6%, 
 Although one could technically make the case that attitudes towards homosexuality in Israel are 20
heterogenous for the fact that a large portion (40%) believe homosexuality should be accepted, which 
indicates views on the matter are polarized (see Pew Research Center 2013).
 In Lebanon 27% of 18-29 year-olds, 17% of 30-49 year-olds, and 10% of individuals 50 years-old and up 21
believe homosexuality should be accepted; a trend common in many other states, but not those in the 
MENA region (Pew Research Center 2013).
 The states/territories included in this dataset are Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Palestine, Iraq, Jordan, 22
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen.
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and 83.6% all respectively stating homosexuality is never justifiable) while the least 
conservative responses came from Cyprus at 36.5% and Bahrain at 42.3% (Ibid).  
 In a survey conducted by Gallup, McCarthy (2014) found that citizens in most 
MENA states do not think their area of residence is hospitable to gays and lesbians; 62% 
of Tunisians, 68% of Turks, 80% of Palestinians, 81% of Lebanese, and 91% of 
Mauritanians  indicated this view. In sum, these surveys typify a regionally consistent 23
aversion to homosexuality seeing that many individuals believe it is morally repugnant. 
The small percentage of individuals that are gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender—and 
the even smaller percentage of individuals who will actually opt to “come out”  in this 24
region—face severe discrimination due to a strong cultural aversion to the idea of one 
deviating away from prominent sexual norms.  
The Social Climates in Morocco, Algeria, & Tunisia 
 Tunisia has a long reputation of being both a social and legally egalitarian state. It 
was the first country in North Africa to offer substantial rights to female citizens. 
President Habib Bourguiba liberalized the Tunisian Personal Status Code in 1956 and 
granted extensive rights to women upon his state’s independence, which was 
unprecedented for the region (Lust 2013, 796).  
 Conversely, progress in Morocco stagnated under King Hassan II (Ibid, 664). 
Once King Mohammed VI inherited the throne, he reformed Morocco’s moudawana 
 Conversely, 49% of Israelis and 50% of Cypriots state that their area of residence is hospitable to gays 23
and lesbians, which is quite impressive from a comparative standpoint (McCarthy 2014).
 See “Coming Out” in Glossary.24
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(family code) in 2003 and granted women an extensive set of rights, thus putting them on 
par with Tunisia and making the country a bit more progressive from a legal standpoint. 
Lust argues that laws have become more equitable as a result of King Mohammed VI’s 
ambitions to integrate Morocco into the world economy (665). For this reason the 
importance of both domestic and international legitimacy is evident to King Mohammad 
VI, as his willingness to modernize Morocco has been quite comprehensive. However, 
this does not diminish the fact that Morocco is still conservative from a social and 
cultural standpoint (664). 
 Algeria, much like Morocco, has a long history of being relatively conservative 
from both a societal and legal perspective (see Charrad 2001). In 1984 new blatantly 
discriminatory family codes were codified under President Chadli Bendjedid, which 
“proclaim[ed] women as minors under the law, and define[d] them as existing only in so 
far as they are daughters, mothers, or wives” (Salhi 2010, 27). In 2004 President 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika signaled that change was “imperative” (Watan 2004) and moved 
forward with the reformation of their family penal codes in 2005 (Marzouki 2010). 
Article 31 of the Algerian constitution now grants political autonomy to women (Ibid), 
although they have yet to reach parity with men in many respects. Recent social 
reformations will not ameliorate decades of cultural conservatism that was reinforced by 
discriminatory laws, but understanding family codes in these three states allows one to 
gauge the overall social climate of each state.  
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 Seeing as how Tunisians have had over fifty years to acclimate to their state’s 
liberal social status codes, one would be reasonable to deduce that this would 
consequentially result in more egalitarian views towards gay rights. Tunisians may still 
not be personally inclined to embrace the prospect of social or legal equality for the gay 
community (seeing as how Pew Research Center [2013] finds that Tunisians are the most 
averse to homosexuality in the region), but they could potentially be more apt to tolerate 
its existence than their neighbors.  
 Tunisia is comparatively more tolerable of homosexuality at least from a legal 
standpoint. Female homosexuality is legal; only male homosexuality is prohibited 
(Itaborahy and Zhu 2014, 48). Both male and female homosexuality is unlawful in 
Morocco and Algeria (Ibid, 40, 30). Predictably, Tunisia is more [legally] indifferent to 
homosexuality; but in contrast, Morocco and Algeria are not. It is fairly common for the 
latter two states to persecute and prosecute individuals that violate anti-homosexuality 
laws, but irrespectively, LGBTQ activism is able to thrive in both places. 
Persecution Against the Moroccan LGBTQ Community 
 The Moroccan monarchy exhibits a morally ambiguous attitude towards the 
notion of homosexuality, but this fact does not imply anti-homosexuality laws go 
unenforced or that gay and trans Moroccans are not disproportionately targeted in 
homophobic acts of violence. Anti-sodomy laws are enforced quite fervently by 
authorities at the local levels. Legal and social persecution against the Moroccan LGBTQ 
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community is not only common, but severe to the extent that it made gay activism 
inevitable once new political resources came to fruition.  
 While the King has an incentive to cultivate international legitimacy and remain 
attentive to the growing international sentiment against homophobia, he has largely 
turned a blind eye to systemic homophobia perpetrated by lower level government 
officials. Instead of arresting gay men and women for violating Article 489—the 
Moroccan penal code that criminalizes homosexuality—authorities help perpetuate the 
facade that Morocco is “gay-friendly” by charging gay people with unrelated offensives 
such as prostitution or alcoholism while simultaneously being more lenient towards gay 
tourists (Hayoun 2014a). This is not always the case seeing that Moroccan officials have 
sparked international outrage in the past by jailing a gay British man in Marrakech, but 
such an event is out of the norm (Rawlinson 2014). Not all gay tourism is welcome, 
however, as a gay cruise was diverted away from a port in Casablanca after authorities 
prohibited it from docking (Gray 2012), but overall, authorities tolerate acts of 
homosexuality by foreigners insofar as their lack of action does not spark outrage 
amongst the conservative constituents of local officials and politicians.  
 Acts of homosexual intimacy are singled out in comparison to other acts deemed 
sexually immoral. Local police turn a blind eye to heterosexual brothels and allow pre-
marital sex between opposite-sex partners to go unpunished (Ibid). It is estimated that 
thousands of gay men have been imprisoned for being gay since Morocco gained 
independence (Harit 2013). While the aforementioned statistic is unsubstantiated, one 
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does not have to look far to witness the prevalence of state-sanctioned homophobia. 
Numerous examples illustrate homophobic abuse by the state. 
 According to the Index on Censorship (2005) forty men and women were all 
simultaneously jailed for two days for suspected homosexuality, and additionally, thirteen 
filmmakers were sentenced to a cumulative total of thirty years in prison for filming 
sexually explicit videos involving gay men (Rhanem 2006). These instances are not 
isolated and occur quite frequently. Two men were jailed after being suspected of 
homosexuality for just sitting in their car together according to Al Arabiya News (2013). 
Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State (2013, Section 6) cites another case whereby 
three gay men were sentenced to three years imprisonment for homosexuality. More 
recently, six men in Fkih Ben Saleh were convicted of homosexuality (Hayoun 2014a). In 
2015 two more men were arrested for homosexuality and convicted less than one month 
later in al Hoceima, which illustrates the ramifications for homosexuality are swift (S. 
Roberts 2015). These instances only encapsulate cases in which the LGBTQ individuals 
were actually prosecuted for violating anti-homosexuality laws. One can speculate that 
many more cases go unreported seeing as how gay men and women may technically be 
indicted for homosexual acts, but charged with an irrelevant crime (see Hayoun 2014a).  
 The most prominent case of homophobia paints a bleak picture for Morocco’s 
LGBTQ community for the fact that it highlights both legal and societal persecution. 
Pfeiffer and Abdennebi (2008) reports that Moroccan authorities raided the house of 
several men thought to be guilty of allegedly participating in an illegal Sufi-esque 
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wedding between a same-sex couple—one of which was believed to be in drag—after an 
online video of the event surfaced. The family of one of the men involved maintains that 
no wedding took place at the residence (Ibid). Still, due to persistent coverage and 
sensationalization, the media may have implicitly incited violence by “smearing” the 
names of the men involved with the making of the video (Belonksy 2008). As a result the 
house where the “ceremony” took place attracted a mob of fundamentalists who rioted 
and ultimately destroyed the house in its entirety according to Pfeiffer and Abdennebi. 
Belonksy explains that the alleged same-sex wedding video managed to amass a large 
following and various Moroccan media outlets capitalized on its popularity. One 
Moroccan newspaper, Al Massae, was fined €100,000 for inaccurately reporting that a 
judge was in attendance of the said wedding (Grew 2008). This event is only one of many 
publicized stories that accentuates the media’s ability to exacerbate already homophobic 
attitudes by sensationalizing LGBTQ stories and vilifying their community. 
 The Overseas Security Advisory Council (2014) declared that Moroccan LGBTQ 
individuals encounter “a great deal of [societal] pressure and/or discrimination” in its 
2014 Crime and Safety Report. The aforementioned empirical examples as well as others 
substantiate this point. Gay men and women have a unique challenge in Morocco. One 
Moroccan lesbian was physically assaulted multiple times in the same week by a 
disgruntled ex-boyfriend once he learned she had become involved in a romantic 
relationship with a woman (Hafften 2012). She was disinclined to file a police report for 
the fact that she anticipated her ex-boyfriend would likely retaliate by reporting her for 
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homosexuality, which in turn would subjugate her to imprisonment instead (Ibid). 
Violence against the LGBTQ community likely goes unreported quite often for this very 
reason, which demonstrates that victims have no legal recourse when it comes to 
homophobic acts of physical abuse. 
 Moroccan society is very hostile to the notion of homosexuality. Merely bringing 
up the matter is grounds for outrage. One member of The Party of Justice and 
Development alleges that public discourse on homosexuality that is perpetuated by NGOs 
violates the religious values of Moroccans  (Sidiguitiebe 2014). Isolated events such as 25
seminars pertaining to LGBTQ issues are the subject of public outrage when they occur 
(Hassan Al-Ashraf 2009). Acceptance of even the smallest semblance of contemplation or 
discussion of homosexuality may be viewed as a tacit endorsement of it (Ibid). The 
climate for the Moroccan LGBTQ community is undeniably toxic.  
Homophobia in Algeria 
 There is evidence to suggest the LGBTQ community in Algeria also encounters 
an immense degree of legal and societal discrimination, although to a lesser extent than 
gay Moroccans. It is still endemic nonetheless. While news stories involving arrests of 
the LGBTQ community occur less frequently in Algeria, this does not imply legal 
persecution is not prevalent, but instead that stories surrounding LGBTQ issues are less 
sensationalized in comparison to Morocco. Numerous anecdotal examples illustrate that 
societal discrimination may be a bit more salient in Algeria than in Morocco.  
 It should be noted that this is a rough paraphrasing of what was said seeing that the article in question 25
was translated from French to English.
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 A transgender woman alleges she has received multiple death threats from 
religious conservatives and notes that employment discrimination is a common 
occurrence for her (Tutton 2010). An Algerian gay rights activist, Yahia Zaidi, explains 
how many gays are subjected to homophobic physical violence (Schweiger 2011). 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the LGBTQ 
community faces severe familial discrimination. Honor killings against gays is a 
phenomenon that still takes place in Algeria when individuals feel a gay family member 
has disgraced the family’s name (see “UNHCR” 2007). This is one of many reasons why 
the LGBTQ community is relegated to a perpetual life of secrecy since Algeria’s overtly 
hostile social climate makes the prospect of coming out infeasible (Slimane 2010).  
 The Algerian LGBTQ community also encounters state-sponsored persecution—
primarily at the local level—as is the case in Morocco (UNHCR 2007). Police often 
persecute and intimidate gay men and women. Yahia Zaidi was arrested for violating anti-
homosexuality laws (333 and 338 of the Algerian penal code) and alleges that local 
authorities plagiarized his signature on a confession form that he refused to sign which 
professed that he was culpable for acts of homosexuality (Schweiger 2011). This is not 
the only case of legal maltreatment. Even an imam was sentenced to two years in jail for 
committing acts of homosexuality (Boudjadi 2010).  
 The climate for Algerian gays is virulent, but this is no secret. There is no veil of 
“gay friendliness” in Algeria, which is arguably contrary to the case of Morocco. Pink 
News (2007) reports that a high court in London rejected a repatriation request of an 
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effeminate Algerian man because the court feared his life would be in jeopardy if he 
returned home. Violence is regularly incited against the Algerian LGBTQ community, as 
its first gay magazine, El-Shad, alleges it received multiple death threats for merely 
existing (Harim 2014). Additionally Mufti Yahia, from the Algerian Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, implicitly advocated for the death of homosexual individuals by stating that it is 
what the Qur’an suggests should be done to them (Jean-Jacques 2014). This type of 
rhetoric is dangerous because it resonates with religious fundamentalists who aim to 
justify and cloak their acts of violence and even honor killings in a shield of legitimacy.  
Bigotry Against the LGBTQ Community in Tunisia 
 While acceptance of gay and trans individuals is not the norm in Tunisia, their 
standard of living is much higher compared to Morocco and Algeria. This is primarily 
contingent on the fact that female homosexuality is not prohibited, and to boot, the 
enforcement of anti-homosexual laws against men is seldom (Lucas 2012). Though many 
gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender individuals opt to stay in the closet, it is 
sometimes possible for them to come out to their families without facing outright 
rejection, and this is especially the case in more liberal households where alcohol is 
consumed and women go unveiled in public (Blackshaw 2012).  
 In spite of an increased level of social egalitarianism in Tunisia, the situation for 
the LGBTQ community was never particularly great for a number of reasons. Male 
homosexuality is illegal, the the collective gay community lacks legal protection from 
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discrimination, and same-sex couples are not granted the same rights as opposite-sex 
couples. This has not changed since democratization.  
 Canning (2011) reports that Ennahda, Tunisia’s largest political party, initially 
pledged to support the liberty of LGBTQ citizens and inferred that their platform would 
include support for decriminalization of male homosexuality. However, according to 
Littauer (2012), Ennahda’s Health Minister, Samir Dilou, spoke out against the gay 
community by stating democratic principles such as freedom of expression should not 
account for “perversion” and stated his belief that gays need medical treatment, thus 
implying homosexuality is a mental disorder. The party has since adopted an anti-gay 
platform as a scare tactic to dissuade voters from electing parties with more secular 
platforms, although it is quite possible that several internal gay scandals within the party 
likely triggered the adoption of such a hardline stance on the matter (Ibid).  
 Furthermore, religiosity has surged since democratization and a discernible 
Salafist movement has burgeoned (Blackshaw 2012). Seeing as how subscribers of 
Salafism often adhere to its homophobic tenants it is logical to speculate that this lead to 
an upswing in societal homophobia. Perhaps for the first time, a tourist was arrested in 
Tunisia for committing homosexual acts, which was unanticipated considering it is 
unconventional for authorities in the region to penalize tourists for homosexuality 
(Morgan 2015).  
 LGBTQ communities in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia face an inordinate amount 
of discrimination, hence the need for unity and political coordination among the 
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aggregate community. However, to publicly advocate for gay equality in the MENA is to 
commit social suicide and/or incite violence against oneself. For this reason, political 
mobilization among LGBTQ communities in all three of these states has been done in a 
manner that is mostly discrete and inconspicuous.  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Chapter 3 
Profiling the Strength of LGBTQ Movements in Morocco, Algeria, & Tunisia !!!!!!!!!!
 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights movements in Morocco and Algeria
—two socially conservative states—are surprisingly robust. Morocco’s gay rights 
movement is more formally organized and prominent than Algeria’s; but nevertheless, 
both are politically active and decent at providing outreach to members of the LGBTQ 
community. Prior to the 2011 Tunisian revolution, members of the LGBTQ community in 
Tunisia have not been politically active at all until 2012, which coincides with the time 
restrictions on internet freedom were lifted. Given that Tunisia has historically been much 
more socially liberal than its Moroccan and Algerian neighbors, a Tunisian gay rights 
movement should have theoretically materialized not only before Morocco and Algeria’s, 
but much sooner than it actually did. Seeing that (a) the level of freedom on the internet 
as well as overall access to it varies in all three of these states, and (b) that the internet 
has been integral to their LGBTQ movements, it seems plausible to attribute variation in 
the strength of these movements to the internet. In order to demonstrate this, it is 
necessary to first determine that there is, in fact, variation in the strength of gay rights 
movements in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia altogether. 
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The Moroccan LGBTQ Movement: A Pioneer in North Africa 
 LGBTQ activism in Morocco is quite prevalent. There is sufficient evidence to 
suggest the gay movement in Morocco has gained an ample amount of momentum to not 
only be categorized into the third tier of online activism, but to also be classified as a full-
fledged social movement. They have flourished into a well-organized political faction 
with both formal and informal organizations, LGBTQ-friendly magazines, and notable 
gay icons (such as Abdella Taia) to represent them and speak out on behalf of the 
aggregate community. Moreover, it is not untimely to assert that the Moroccan gay 
movement is on the cusp of advancing to the fourth tier of activism since they arguably 
pose a small threat to the regime’s legitimacy. Their heightened level of international 
visibility could induce scrutiny on the regime if they call attention to governmental abuse, 
which keeps the monarchy in check and prevents it from becoming overtly homophobic 
(which may explain its gay-friendly facade or, at best, apathy towards homosexuality). 
The ability of gay activists to obtain straight allies such as domestic pro-civil rights 
organizations (Hayoun 2014a) and international actors (ranging from American and 
British celebrities to NGOs) has allowed them to increasingly cultivate more political 
clout at an expeditious pace.  
 In 2010 King Mohammed VI did not concede to the demands of anti-gay social 
conservatives whom petitioned him to disallow the British musician, Elton John, from 
performing at Morocco’s annual Marwazine music festival (Ghanmi 2010). Officials 
from Morocco’s largest Islamic party, The Party of Justice and Development, along with 
!36
Islamists across the country voiced concerns with his performance and argued that 
permitting such an event could corrupt Moroccan youth by encouraging sexual 
promiscuity and alcoholism (Ibid). The King disregarded this rhetoric and allowed the 
performance to take place likely in an attempt to make Morocco appear more modern 
(Ibid). It is plausible to assume King Mohammed VI’s decision was contingent on the 
fact that he did not want to draw unwelcome international scrutiny to the regime seeing 
as how it could be detrimental to his economic aspirations and impede his ability to 
establish international trade deals (Lust 2013, 665).  
 The King’s indifference to homosexuality has put him in a unique political 
predicament, nevertheless. In an attempt to appease both religious conservatives and 
social progressives, he walks a fine line. Regardless of the fact that he has yet to indicate 
support for, nor has he explicitly endorsed any LGBTQ issues, his apathetic view has 
perpetuated a plethora of rumors that he himself might be a homosexual. The search 
query “is king mohammed vi gay?” currently turns up 5,630,000 results on Google in 
Arabic, 430,000 results in English, and 323,000 results in French . This clearly speaks to 26
the fact that many Moroccans are highly conservative when it comes to homosexuality 
and that anything other than complete and total condemnation of it will result in criticism. 
This is problematic for the fact that it incentivizes individuals to become unabashedly 
homophobic in an attempt to appear less suspicious themselves. Irrespectively, the King 
has allowed openly gay pop stars to return to the country.   
 These results are based off the translation of the search term from English to Arabic and from English to 26
French.
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 Four years after Elton John’s visit Morocco opened the doors to Ricky Martin, 
who gave a nod to Morocco’s LGBTQ community during his performance by changing 
all female pronouns in his song lyrics to male pronouns (Wong 2014). This example 
encapsulates the fact that Moroccan gay activists have managed to gain support from gay 
rights activists abroad, those of which are willing to make statements on behalf of their 
community (though such a gesture serves little more than symbolism). It also denotes the 
level of influence the LGBTQ movement in Morocco has attained. They have conveyed a 
message to the world stating that their situation is dismal and that change is needed. 
 Morocco’s first formal gay rights organization, Kif-Kif, has existed since 2005 
(Bradley 2010, 250). Kif-Kif is a pro-LGBTQ advocacy organization that is 
headquartered in Spain with approximately fifty staff members (Ibid). Smith (2010) 
reports that Kif-Kif has been directly instrumental in the creation of Morocco’s first gay 
magazine, Mithly (meaning “the same as me”	  in English). Their next goal is to construct a  
“center to provide psychological support” for members of the LGBTQ community in 
Morocco, but this goal is not within reach at the moment (Association Alouen 2011). 
Nonetheless, they have been instrumental at fostering discussion about gay rights and are 
considered a “leader” in the Maghreb (Ibid).  
 Kif-Kif has faced harassment amid growing levels of eminence. Their web 
domain has been hacked multiple times by anti-gay Islamic groups (Bradley, 250); still, 
Kif-Kif has not disbanded. Moroccan activists have proven to be resilient. Though 
political demonstrations are prohibited in Morocco, LGBTQ activists often participate in 
!38
pride marches abroad, where they are safe to do so (Hayoun 2014b). LGBTQ activism 
has steadily burgeoned in Morocco since its inception. Its gay rights movement has 
acquired a substantial level of influence in comparison to other LGBTQ movements in 
the region. Their presence has, in effect, prevented the monarchy from becoming more 
abusive, although they have been unsuccessful at pressuring King Mohammed VI to 
reign in local authorities. 
LGBTQ Activism in Algeria: Late Start, Steady Growth 
 Seeing as how discrimination permeates through Algerian society, there is 
undoubtedly a need for political mobilization. That is indeed the case. Besides having an 
LGBTQ magazine, the gay movement in Algeria has progressed to the point to also be 
categorized into the third tier of postmaterialist activism; however, it is arguably not on 
par with Morocco’s LGBTQ movement. Nonetheless, the movement—also rooted in 
online activism—has progressed quite well since its emergence.  
 There are two prominent LGBTQ associations; Alouen and Abu Nawas. Alouen is 
an activist organization that prioritizes social equality and advocates for decriminalization 
of homosexuality and the repeal of penal codes 333 and 338 (see “Association Alouen” in 
references). On the other hand, Abu Nawas is more outreach-oriented and provides 
various resources to members of the gay community such as education on safe-sex 
practices (see “Abu Nawas”). Both organizations specialize in political mobilization; 
Alouen coordinates events while Abu Nawas encourages LGBTQ citizens to vote (Ibid). 
Additionally, there are two prominent online-exclusive LGBTQ magazines: Lexo 
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Fanzine, a magazine tailored to lesbian issues such as increasing visibility of the women 
in the LGBTQ community, and Kelmaghreb, which is the male equivalent (Jean-Jacques 
2014). Moreover the Algerian LGBTQ community participates in the International Day 
Against Homophobia and Transphobia (Ibid). According to Afrol News (2010) the 
LGBTQ Facebook group, “Union des Gays et Lesbiennes en Algérie,” mobilized 
members of the community to light thousands of candles in public in order to encourage 
greater visibility of the LGBTQ community and call for the decriminalization of 
homosexuality.  
 Algerian activists have also been successful in founding ‘TenTen,’ the national 
day of celebration for LGBTQ individuals. Their biggest success, much like the 
Moroccan LGBTQ community, has been to gain the support of international allies who 
have called for a repeal of laws criminalizing homosexuality at a UN Human Rights 
Council event in Geneva on behalf of gay Algerians (Jean-Jacques 2014). With respect to 
the strength of movements, Morocco and Algeria are fairly similar, but Morocco’s 
movement is a bit stronger and may advance to the fourth tier of activism relatively soon. 
This is primarily due to Morocco’s LGBTQ movement being more formerly organized 
and having a greater level of international visibility. 
The Tunisian LGBTQ Movement: Nonexistent Until Democratization 
 It is easier to be a member of the LGBTQ community in Tunisia than in Morocco 
or Algeria, but there is still an unmistakable need for political mobilization. Nevertheless, 
there were virtually no signs of LGBTQ activism under Ben Ali’s repressive authoritarian 
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regime. Upon his ousting, the first pro-gay Tunisian Facebook page, “Kelmty - 
Associations Gays et Lesbiennes Tunisiens,”  appeared in 2012 and managed to finally 27
surpass 1,500 likes by March 2014 and currently has over 2,500 likes. Kelmty has since 
founded a website to act as a portal to their blog and various social media sites. Kelmty 
differs from groups like Kif-Kif and Alouen in that it does not coordinate pro-equality 
events or protests, but instead highlights issues that impact the Tunisian LGBTQ 
community. Moreover, a Maghreb-based online magazine, “Gayday,” which covers North 
African gay issues has managed to gain popularity amongst Tunisia’s gay community; 
although it was not created by Tunisia’s LGBTQ community and is instead a regional 
magazine that is inclusive of them (Littauer 2012).  
 The Huffington Post (2015) reports that, in addition to Kelmty, more informal 
organizations have surfaced as of late including several Facebook pages like “LGBTI  28
Tunisien” and “Decriminalization of Homosexuality in Tunisia.” The extent of LGBTQ 
activism in Tunisia is still limited overall. This is because it is a new phenomenon. Once 
one of the aforementioned groups emerge as the de facto organization for LGBTQ 
activism in Tunisia—as was the case with Kif-Kif in Morocco and Alouen in Algeria—
more coordinated online campaigns should become commonplace. Kelmty seems poised 
to assume that role.  
!
 See “Kelmty - Associations Gays et Lesbiennes Tunisiens” 2015 in references.27
 The “I” in this acronym represents inter-sex individuals who are, for the most part, born with ambiguous 28
genitalia. This is an oversimplification since the “inter-sex” label may be applicable in other situations as 
well.
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Figure 3.1: Strength of LGBTQ Movements in Morocco, Algeria, & Tunisia !
!
 Tunisia’s gay rights movement, akin to neighboring Moroccan and Algerian 
movements, has progressed steadily since its emergence (see Figure 3.1). Bearing in mind 
that most of Tunisia’s pro-gay organizations are informal and have yet to transcend their 
online origins, LGBTQ activism in Tunisia can be only categorized into the second!
tier of online activism. This is mostly due to the fact that its gay rights movement 
recently developed and activists have yet to coordinate any effective online campaigns. 
This is quite impressive considering this movement did not meet the criteria for even the 
first tier just four years ago under Ben Ali. What took so long? Why did LGBTQ activism 
proliferate in authoritarian Morocco and Algeria, but not in pre-revolutionary Tunisia? 
What political opportunities would make the development of gay rights movements 
possible? A literature review of existing theories on what catalyzes social movements will 
be discussed in the following chapter.  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Chapter 4 
Existing Theoretical Explanations !
!
!
!
!
 A Tunisian gay rights movement did not exist until after the 2011 revolution, 
where Tunisia became a democracy. Contrarily, fairly robust LGBTQ movements have 
existed in Morocco and Algeria since the mid and late 2000s, respectively. This implies 
the emergence of these movements is attributed to a particular causal factor that was not 
present in Tunisia until after it democratized. Therefore it will prove fruitful to evaluate 
theoretical explanations in existing literature to determine which factors are most 
conducive to the emergence of new social movements and gauge whether they are 
relevant to the aforesaid cases. 
 In order to identify casual explanations for the emergence of social movements, it 
is necessary to first define them. McCarthy and Zald (1977) define social movements as, 
“a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing 
some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society”	  (1217-8). 
Tilly (2004) cites three components that are fundamental to social movements. First, 
social movements involve an “organized public effort”	  (Ibid, 3) that takes shape as a 
“campaign [which] extends beyond any single event”	  (4). Second, Tilly argues social 
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movements necessitate the building of coalitions, “public meetings, solemn processions, 
vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in the public media, and 
pamphleteering”	  (3). Finally, members of social movements should exert four 
characteristics that Tilly refers to as “WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and 
commitment”	  (4). Melucci (1996) states that individuals within these movements seek to 
communicate the fact that they have poor standing in society and aim to adjust “cultural 
codes”	  to the betterment of their group (9). 
Theory of Relative Deprivation and Moral Protests 
 There is no paucity of theoretical explanations when it comes to causal factors for 
political activism, particularly with respect to social movements. However, many theories 
fail to account for micro acts of social activism or smaller movements and instead focus 
on more broad macro social movements, namely revolutions wherein dissatisfaction due 
to governmental or economic factors is widespread. For example, Davies (1962) cites the 
theory of relative deprivation as an explanation for social movements. He argues that 
when abrupt stoppages of economic development occurs after elongated periods of 
economic growth the overall “mood [of society] becomes revolutionary”	  (5). There is, 
nevertheless, attention applied to activism surrounding issues of public morality too. 
Jasper discusses the concept of moral protests; a form of collective action against 
governmental or societal acts of injustice, ranging from anti-war protests to pro-equality 
civil rights movements (1997, 3). 
!
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Resource Mobilization Theory & New Social Movement Theory 
 The emergence of social movements is widely attributed to resource mobilization 
theory, which is a dominate theory in social movement research (Buechler 1995). 
Resource mobilization theory posits that activists will mobilize once political resources 
surface; that is, when new opportunities for collective action manifest (e.g. a larger 
number of disenchanted individuals feel as though they have something to gain from 
protesting, organizations develop, new proxies for mobilization emerge, and/or monetary 
resources become available), this fosters conditions that are conducive to political 
mobilization seeing that it is now feasible (Reger and Dugan 2001, 337). Conversely, new 
social movement theory contends that social movements may materialize when 
dissatisfied actors aim to improve their “quality”	  of life and coalesce around a group 
identity in which activism is linked to inextricably (Ibid). Buechler states, “some new 
social movement theorists emphasize the role of postmaterialist values in much 
contemporary collective action, as opposed to conflicts over material resources”	  (1995, 
442).  
 Of these two paradigms, resource mobilization theory is the most suitable in 
accounting for LGBTQ movements in authoritarian regimes. New social movement 
theory is cogent, but dissatisfaction alone will not likely suffice as a catalyst for gay 
rights movements since individuals must be able to engage in activism in the first place. 
New social movement theory lacks an important ceteris paribus condition: access to a 
new political resource that makes mobilization possible. The internet is the new political 
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resource that makes gay rights activism in authoritarian regimes possible because it 
diminishes the costs of engaging in political activism. Availability of more discrete and 
covert options for political protests draws people to the movement since rational actors 
will be disinclined to engage in activism if it will further jeopardize their standing in 
society.  
 There is one reason why social movement theory is probably inapplicable to 
LGBTQ activism in authoritarian regimes: it cannot explain why gay rights movements 
do not exist in states where LGBTQ communities share common identities due to 
governmental and peer marginalization. These conditions should have, according to 
social movement theory, fostered a common identity strong enough to catalyze gay 
movements in many states; however, not all states have gay movements despite the 
existence of shared identities among LGBTQ communities. This indicates a collective 
identity is not sufficient to catalyze gay movements, which undercuts the utility of social 
movement theory. 
 Both paradigms have faults. When it comes to resource mobilization theory, it 
neglects the role of identity politics in the emergence of social movements, whereas new 
social movement theory overemphasizes identity politics and omits the importance of 
new political opportunities. New social movement theory’s identity thesis is compelling, 
but resource mobilization theory’s political opportunity thesis is more pertinent given the 
evidence for what catalyzed LGBTQ movements in North Africa (provided in Chapter 6). 
Members of the LGBTQ community may want to mobilize due to shared histories, 
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identities, and goals, but are unable to do so in hostile autocracies. This implies new 
social movement theory may be more applicable to LGBTQ movements in democracies. 
Resource mobilization theory’s emphasis on political opportunities is more fitting for 
LGBTQ movements in authoritarian regimes since it presupposes that individuals with 
shared identities already want to engage in activism, but will refrain from doing so until 
they have the ability to, which will be determined by the level of access they have to the 
internet. 
Modernization Theory 
 Modernization theory implies the emergence of gay rights movements will be 
contingent on society’s adoption of more modern views, which is dependent on a state’s 
level of economic development. Marks (2009) explains,  
as societies develop they become more open, socioeconomic achievements 
become less tied to social background and other ascribed characteristics, and 
education becomes more crucial to socioeconomic outcomes. […] Social 
background becomes less important and social attainment becomes more 
universalistic (918).  !
As education becomes more salient to individuals, their views towards other issues 
gradually changes and becomes more modern and egalitarian, particularly with respect to 
issues concerning social equality, ranging from “increasing equality of opportunity in 
education” to “prohibiting discriminatory practices” (Ibid). As a result of the adoption of 
these values, movements for these [postmaterialist] causes will begin to materialize, 
including gay rights movements. The theory itself is highly influential in the field of 
sociology and political science, but holds only a minimal level of explanatory power 
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when it comes to LGBTQ movements in authoritarian regimes seeing that they have 
already emerged in many regimes that have not yet undergone economic industrialization 
or diversification. 
Additional Hypotheses 
 Academic explanations for the development of gay rights movements in 
developing countries and/or authoritarian regimes are scarce. Nonetheless, there is one by 
M. Roberts (1995) that is eloquent. He argues that a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS—a 
crisis which disproportionately impacts gay and bisexual men—could catalyze LGBTQ 
activism. Gay rights groups in India, Jamaica, and Malaysia organized in an effort to 
combat the spread of HIV and AIDS within their community by offering treatment and 
education for safe-sex practices (254). He contends that an Ecuadorian gay rights group 
formed solely as a response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic (256). In Mexico, the Grupo 
Orgullo Homosexual de Liberacion, made it one of their foremost concerns in spite of the 
fact that their formation was not premised on the idea of HIV/AIDS mitigation (Ibid). M. 
Roberts writes, “the role that gay identification and gay community development plays in 
reducing risk behavior […] among gays cannot be underestimated”	  (260). The application 
of this hypothesis, however, is limited.  
 There are three main problems with the aforesaid hypothesis; all of which indicate 
that it may be inapplicable to LGBTQ activism in the Middle Eastern and North African 
region. First, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is not unique to gay communities in many 
developing countries, especially African states. There is a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
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among both heterosexuals and homosexuals in Uganda, for example, yet a large gay 
rights movement still exists (Kuhanen 2008). Many Sub-Saharan African states have high 
rates of HIV/AIDS among their entire populations, therefore mobilization within gay 
communities solely to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS seems unnecessary unless there is 
a significant statistical variation in infection rates between homosexuals and 
heterosexuals. Second, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the MENA region is very low; it 
is less than 1% in every state in the region (CIA World Factbook 2014c). Third, this 
hypothesis applies only to gay and bisexual men and not women. This is problematic 
because if HIV/AIDS were more prevalent among gay men and could catalyze activism, 
then one would expect a lack of participation among lesbians and bisexual women, but 
that is not the case seeing that they actively participate in LGBTQ activism in the MENA. 
Such a hypothesis is well-reasoned, but likely too outdated to apply to gay rights 
movements in the MENA. 
Explanations of Catalyzing Factors That Are Exclusive to the MENA Region 
 Most of the aforementioned theories and arguments demonstrate how and why 
movements formulate in a more general sense; that is, they apply to many types of 
movements across a broad range of regime types throughout the world. Competing 
theoretical perspectives and LGBTQ-specific arguments are valuable, but it is also 
necessary to explore catalyzing factors for grass roots mobilization that are exclusive to 
the Middle Eastern and North African region.  
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 The adoption of free market-oriented neoliberal policies and globalization has 
contributed to a decline of the middle class in a plethora of states in the Arab world 
(Bayat 2002, 2). Widespread socioeconomic disenfranchisement in politically restrictive 
regimes has forced innovation amongst grass roots activists. Bayat argues sociopolitical 
activism—mostly in Egypt and Iran—manifests in the form of “quiet encroachment,” a 
type of pseudo-movement wherein “direct” action is taken by activists in that they 
“acquire the basic necessities of their lives (land for shelter, urban collective 
consumption, informal jobs, business opportunities) in a quiet and unassuming, illegal 
fashion” (3). For example, citizens will power their shelters by stealing electricity from 
“municipal power poles” or illegally extend “water pipes to their domiciles” to avoid 
paying for water (20). 
 Quiet encroachment may not be politically motivated, but it has inadvertent 
political consequences. Bayet refers to it as “everyday resistance” since these acts of civil 
disobedience cost states money (19-20). Socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals in 
these states are barred from participating in demonstrations, so as a means of procuring 
basic necessities, they take it upon themselves to obtain them as opposed to pressuring 
the government to provide it for them. Bayat writes, “informal and often uncharged use 
of collective services leaves governments little choice but selectively to integrate the 
informal settlements, hoping to commit the residents to pay for services they have thus 
far used illegally” (21).  
!50
 Alternately, deliberate acts of civil disobedience such as ad hoc outbreaks of riots 
and mass protests may be triggered by particular events (Bayat 2000). This is 
demonstrated by the 1980s riots that transpired throughout the the region (Ibid, 5). In 
Morocco and Tunisia, reductions in various government subsidies catalyzed mass 
protests; in Algeria citizens rioted due to a rise in the cost of living (Ibid). 
 More formally organized political activism in the MENA region often occurs 
through proxies such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or labor unions (Bayat 
2000). Akin to the Western world, labor unions in the MENA—though functionally 
limited—have been instrumental in organizing strikes and protests due to “distributive 
issues and unjust labor practices” (7). Similarly, NGOs have been somewhat useful to the 
extent that their “headquarters also act as a place of sociability, where local poor families 
can gather outside their homes to associate with other poor” (21). This can be useful for 
mobilization purposes and also to build solidarity among the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged, but many NGOs have a more charitable character and mostly use 
resources to maintain social safety nets for the poor (22). Bayat contends that this is 
primarily due to a love-hate relationship between NGOs and states. NGOs are unable to 
bolster grass roots efforts because “surveillance poses a real obstacle to the autonomous 
and healthy operation” of their facilities (23).  
 It is also the case that activism begins at mosques. Muslim groups (such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood) have amassed tremendous amounts of political power. Islamic-
oriented social movements are able to emerge and thrive due to funding from both 
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subscribers of Islam as well as “Muslim businesses,” thus allowing them to not only 
monetarily assist the poor by distributing basic necessities to impoverished Muslim 
communities, but also to become politically active in order to improve living conditions 
for other Muslims (16). This can pressure governments to act as they, in effect, are forced 
to directly compete with these organizations for citizens’ allegiance. Bayat explains that 
the Egyptian government enacted “measures to upgrade slums and squatter areas” in 
Cairo because Islamic groups had essentially established proxy governments over 
territories where citizens relied on their goods and services (Ibid).  
 Though social movement organizations (SMOs) in the Middle East and North 
Africa often assumes the forms of labor unions, NGOs, and Islamic groups, their 
existence is not dependent on them altogether. Bayat explains, “urban grassroots groups 
may find that the community or neighborhood offers a sense of common identity and a 
ground for collective action” (9). Community activism materializes when a united group 
coalesces to gain power over issues that impacts them. Bayat explains how citizens have 
come together to protest the pollution that disproportionately affects their community, or 
how they have combined resources to lobby politicians (10). Solidarity among 
communities and the ability of citizens to unite around a common cause is a trend that is 
typically responsible for catalyzing movements not only in the MENA region, but 
elsewhere too. Though members of the LGBTQ community have reasons to unite around 
their common cause, none of these MENA-specific explanations are applicable to the rise 
of gay activism in the region, as they are in line with the new social movement theory 
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school of thought, which is not suitable for the study of LGBTQ movements in 
authoritarian regimes. 
The Cruciality of the Internet to Gay Rights Activism 
 Unlike movements motivated by economic factors, members of the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender community face unique obstacles since they are loathed by 
governments and societies in the MENA. Their ability to forge movements will be 
entirely contingent upon one fundamental resource for the time being: the internet. This 
may not be the case for other types of movements, hence the multitude of explanations 
for their existence, but LGBTQ activism is distinct. Homosexuality and gender deviation 
are considered social taboo in every state in the region.  Their cause is simply too 29
controversial for public demonstrations to occur.  
 Muslim-majority countries are highly conservative. The idea of homosexuality is 
haram; that is, it runs contrary to the teachings of Islam. While not all Muslims will 
interpret the Qur’an or Hadith to justify homophobia, it is highly unlikely that religious 
conservatives will be responsive to gay rights messages. LGBTQ communities cannot 
initiate mass protests, nor can they peacefully demonstrate for three reasons; (i) they 
comprise very small portions of the populations of each state, and (ii) doing so will result 
in immediate retaliation, as Arab society is highly conservative and religious, and (iii) 
public admittance of one’s homosexuality or non-cisgender identity equates to a 
confession of guilt due to the illegality of these identities. For the fact that they lack both 
 Although Iran is an exception with respect to gender identity. 29
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numbers, social acceptance, and legal protection it is infeasible for them to engage in 
activism unless it is rooted in the online realm.  
  In the event LGBTQ advocates held a public demonstration, they would likely 
face severe repercussions; verbal harassment, physical assault, and even could be killed 
by more fundamentalist individuals. Inevitably, they would also be ostracized by peers, 
fired from their jobs, and arrested seeing as how they are implicitly admitting to violating 
legal prohibitions against homosexuality. If the goal is to get their voices heard and 
pressure their governments to decriminalize homosexuality, it is pivotal that their 
activism is executed exclusively online, otherwise they will have to travel abroad to 
participate in other states’ gay pride marches. Due to the globalized nature of more visible 
annual pride parades, they would be competing with many other states’ LGBTQ 
movements for press attention.  
 There are, of course, exceptions to this unwritten rule. Lebanon is unique in 
comparison with other states in that its LGBTQ community has participated in actual 
domestic public protests in front of governmental buildings, many of which have 
occurred in front of the Ministry of Justice in Beirut (Littaurer 2013; Amand 2012). One 
notable demonstration occurred due to outrage over six gay and trans individuals being 
detained for going to a pro-LGBTQ club (Littauer 2013) and another was in response to 
legislation mandating the use of “anal probe”	  tests administered exclusively to men in 
order to “test” them for homosexuality (Amand 2012). Additionally, nearly 200 
individuals gathered in Sodeco to advocate equality for the Lebanese LGBTQ community 
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(Achi 2009). Had these protests occurred in any other MENA states (excluding Israel, 
Turkey and Cyprus) swift retaliation from the state would ensue, or rather, a violent 
counter-protest could erupt. 
 Since the internet is integral to gay MENA activists, out of all the theories and 
arguments examined, resource mobilization theory is best able to explain the emergence 
of LGBTQ movements in MENA authoritarian regimes for two reasons. First, it is 
premised on the notion that the materialization of social movements is contingent on new 
political opportunities that make mobilization practicable. Second, the arrival of the 
internet—the crème de la crème of political opportunities for marginalized groups—
coincides with the emergence of LGBTQ movements across the region in terms of 
timing. The cruciality of the internet to gay activism is illustrated by the fact that the 
Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian gay rights movements all had online geneses. 
Domestic activism in all three states is extremely rare, and when done, it must occur very 
quietly unless it is online. 
 In effect, LGBTQ activists have two options: (a) participate in public activism 
abroad, or (b) engage in domestic activism almost exclusively online. Tunisian and 
Algerian activists opt for the latter while Moroccan activists engage in the former. The 
strength of the Moroccan LGBTQ movement in comparison with its neighbors is much 
stronger, and to boot, they have existed longer, thus giving them more time to acquire 
funds and visibility. Public activism is likely more impactful, but due to limited 
resources, Algerian and Tunisian activists have only been able to mobilize online. 
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 The internet is essential to gay activism primarily due to its capacity to lower the 
costs and reduce barriers for actors aiming to engage in it. If the barriers to entry for 
disadvantaged groups are low then one 
has an incentive to engage in activism 
to attain a higher social status. This can 
be explained by contrasting the costs of 
engaging in activism with the 
perceived payoff. If a group is not 
vulnerable and the perceived payoff is 
low, there will be no incentives to 
mobilize. Gay citizens are very vulnerable, and due to high costs, they likely predict a 
low payoff for engaging in activism without anonymity. The internet virtually eliminates 
the costs to engaging in activism, thus increasing the probability it will transpire (gay 
activism can be mapped onto quadrants A and C on Figure 4.1 if internet access is 
adequate). This is why gay rights movements can now emerge in authoritarian regimes. 
 Other movements also utilize the internet for political mobilization, but worker’s 
rights and environmentalist movements could hypothetically survive without the internet. 
Few individuals would discriminate against these types of movements because there are 
collective benefits entailed with protection of worker’s rights or the environment. That is 
not the case when it comes to homosexuality and gender identity. People want to hurt 
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them. For this reason, a lack of internet access makes political mobilization of the 
LGBTQ community virtually impossible due to high costs and a low payoff.  
!57
Chapter 5 
Overview of Hypotheses !
!
!
!
 There are three factors that potentially explain why gay rights movements 
emerged in Morocco and Algeria, but not in Tunisia until after its democratic transition: 
(i) variation in internet access between states, (ii) differences in degrees of governmental, 
societal, and/or media discrimination, and (iii) increased political liberalization in 
Morocco and Algeria, but not Tunisia. One of the following three hypotheses may explain 
variation in the aforementioned three cases, and more broadly, explain the existence of 
gay rights movements in authoritarian regimes in the MENA altogether: 
• H1: The Internet Mobilization Hypothesis - Once citizens from marginalized 
groups gain sufficient access to the internet—due increased internet penetration, 
the expansion of broadband infrastructure, and greater availability of 
smartphones—and can use it freely, they will utilize it as a tool to politically 
mobilize and fight back against government and/or societal persecution and 
repression, thus initiating a new movement. I speculate that this hypothesis will 
be most apt at explaining why LGBTQ movements exist in authoritarian 
regimes because resource mobilization theory contends that new political 
opportunities are required for the materialization of new movements. The 
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internet is perhaps the sole medium in which LGBTQ activism is able to exist in 
the MENA, therefore it can be classified as the political opportunity that makes 
this type of activism possible.  
• H2: The Social Blowback Hypothesis  - When a disadvantaged group 
encounters a surge of persecution—regardless if the source of bias comes from 
the government, the media, or other members of society—the aforementioned 
group will mobilize in order to temporarily push back against this injustice with 
an episode of activism in response. If episodes of persecution increase in 
frequency and/or severity, the sporadic episodes of activism could become more 
persistent and ultimately transform into a sustained movement. This is a well-
reasoned hypothesis, however, it seems more fitting for LGBTQ activism in 
democratic regimes, as it presupposes (a) barriers to the emergence of new 
social movements are already diminished, and (b) that a sufficient degree of 
repression is all that is required to catalyze a gay rights movement, but if that 
were the case nearly every state in the world would have a sizable LGBTQ 
movement seeing that episodes of persecution against the gay community are 
very common in most states. 
• H3: The Political Liberalization Hypothesis - More robust authoritarian 
regimes may aim to cultivate both domestic and international legitimacy and 
extend their longevity by allowing for greater levels of political participation. 
This may involve loosening prohibitions on public demonstrations and allowing 
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opposition parties and other previously repressed political factions to form by 
holding elections for particular government offices or by facilitating greater 
inclusion of women and minority groups in legislatures by adopting gender 
quotas or reserved seats. This will result in the emergence of a plethora of new 
movements. By doing this the state, in effect, only pays lip service to the idea of 
pluralism, but it will inevitably catalyze new movements that would not 
otherwise exist. This hypothesis is likely a practicable explanation for the 
emergence of many social movements across the MENA region, but not gay 
rights movements. Political liberalization will be valuable to many groups, but 
it will not diminish societal homophobia, therefore gay rights movements may 
still not materialize unless they are able to mobilize in a manner that is discrete 
and protects their identities.  
 I expect that the internet mobilization hypothesis will be most able to explain why 
LGBTQ movements emerge in Middle Eastern and North African authoritarian regimes. 
The internet mobilization hypothesis can anticipate not only which states these 
movements will likely take place in, but also the overall strength of these movements. I 
speculate that one should be able to predict both the existence and size of a state’s 
LGBTQ movement based solely on a comprehensive evaluation of internet penetration 
rates as well as internet freedom. Nonetheless, the other two aforementioned hypotheses 
could partially account for the existence of LGBTQ movements as well. Given this 
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possibility, I will highlight my reasoning for why all three of these hypotheses could yield 
at least some explanatory value. 
The Internet Mobilization Hypothesis 
 The internet allows for political mobilization that is anonymous and 
inconspicuous. It minimizes the threat of legal or physical retaliation against the group 
for speaking out. It also lowers both costs and barriers to engaging in activism, and for 
this reason, it is an invaluable political tool that LGBTQ rights advocates can utilize in 
order to stake their claim in politics. Internet availability as well as internet freedom has 
recently become more widely available in the MENA region, therefore it seems logical to 
attribute the rise of gay rights movements to the internet. 
 In comparison to the Western world the Middle East and North Africa have lower 
internet penetration rates, but that is not to say internet use altogether is non-existent. The 
rate of internet usage  (see Table 5.1) ranges from 1% in Iraq to 61% in the United Arab 30
Emirates with a regional average of 26% (see CIA World Factbook 2014a; 2014b 
[reference Footnote 30 for methodology]). 
 In some circumstances governments may undercut the utility of internet access by 
implementing censorship laws. Amid growing pro-democracy protests in Algeria in 2011,	  
President Abdelaziz Boutifleka’s blocked internet access for many users; numerous 
citizens reported that their Facebook accounts had been deleted altogether (Ramdani 
 Internet penetration is calculated by converting the ratio of “internet users : total population” into a 30
percentage using internet usage data from CIA World Factbook (2014a) and population size statistics from 
CIA World Factbook (2014b).
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Table 5.1: Internet Penetration in the Middle East and North Africa 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are total number of internet users. Mauritania was excluded from the table 
due to space restraints. Its penetration is 2.1% (Pop. 3,516,806). 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2014a; 2014b. !!
2011). The rate of internet usage in Algeria is only 12.1%, and any strangulation of this 
crucial resource could prove detrimental to a movement. This is not the norm in Algeria. 
Moroccans and Algerians have enjoyed a substantial degree of freedom on the internet, 
whereas internet censorship was prevalent for Tunisians under Ben Ali’s regime (see 
Freedom House 2011; Ibid. 2014; OpenNet Initiative 2009a; Ibid. 2009b). Morocco, a 
state with a sizable gay rights movement with a high level of visibility and influence, has 
a substantial rate of internet usage at 40.1% (see Table 5.1) as well a high degree of 
internet freedom (OpenNet Initiative 2009b). The existence of a large Moroccan LGBTQ 
movement is consistent with the internet mobilization hypothesis bearing in mind the 
aforementioned internet statistics. Since LGBTQ movements in all three of these states 
emerged online—and still occurs online for the most part—the internet mobilization 
hypothesis is likely capable of explaining the existence of these movements and why they 
vary in strength. 
!
Algeria Bahrain Cyprus Egypt Iran Iraq Israel
12.1% 
(4,700,000)
31.9% 
(419,500)
37% 
(433,900)
23.2% 
(20,136,000)
10.7% 
(8,214,000)
1% 
(325,900)
57.9% 
(4,525,000)
Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Palestine
20.7% 
(1,642,000)
40.1% 
(1,100,000)
17% 
(1,000,000)
5.7% 
(353,900)
40.1% 
(13,213,000)
45.5 
(1,465,000)
30.3% 
(1,379,000)
Qatar S. A. Syria Tunisia Turkey U.A.E. Yemen
26.6% 
(563,800)
35.7% 
(9,774,000)
24.9% 
(4,469,000)
32% 
(3,500,000)
33.4% 
(27,233,000)
61.3% 
(3,449,000)
9% 
(2,349,000)
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The Social Blowback Hypothesis 
 Blowback is a term that is not necessarily rooted in social activism, nor has it 
previously had academic underpinnings. It is a term coined by the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency to explain the repercussions of American militarism in the Middle 
East (Bergen and Reynolds 2005). Blowback is one consequence of U.S. foreign 
involvement in states such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Airstrikes and the use of drones 
against terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS may result in collateral damage, which 
could potentially lead to further radicalization of moderate individuals in the region that 
would not have otherwise joined jihadist movements (Goodman 2013). Blowback is, in 
essence, a retaliatory response either from individuals that knew someone who became 
victims of collateral damage or from individuals that feel the U.S. is waging a “war on 
Islam”	  (Ibid). An example is the Sunni rebellion that was triggered by the U.S. 
government’s decision to cleanse the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist 
party, which ultimately lead to a civil war between Shias and Sunnis once the new Shia 
government began to disenfranchise Sunnis.  
 The blowback theory can be modified to fit sociopolitical settings. Reengineering 
it to explain why movements for postmaterialist causes emerge can be done in the 
following manner: if a government subjects a particular group of individuals to an 
episode of extreme persecution, that group might push back with a retaliatory response 
(i.e. protesting) against these acts of repression, thus spawning a brief period of activism 
that could ultimately result in a sustained movement. There are numerous empirical and 
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historical examples that are illustrative of “social”	  blowback. The birth of the American 
LGBTQ movement surfaced due to the culmination of a months-long episode of legal 
persecution from the U.S. government (Falk 2014). A police raid on the Stonewall Inn 
gay bar in 1969 lead to social blowback in the form of riots. Once these dissipated the 
movement for gay equality remained. Falk writes, “the demonstrations in the days after, 
became a rallying cry to fight back against the force used against the patrons of the bar 
that night.”	  If blowback against governmental marginalization catalyzed the American 
gay rights movement, it should, in theory, be applicable elsewhere.	  	   David Bahati, a member of the Ugandan parliament who introduced the infamous 
anti-gay bill which sought to make homosexuality punishable by death in Uganda, may 
be responsible for spawning a wave of gay activism seeing as how LGBTQ Ugandans 
were compelled to mobilize politically in order to prevent the bill from being codified, 
but President Musevini ultimately signed a less harsh, albeit still draconian bill into law 
that made homosexuality punishable by life in prison (Karimi and Thompson 2014). 
Since this episode gay rights activism in Uganda has become more prevalent. The 
Ugandan Kuchu  community created and published their own magazine (Merrill 2015), 31
they have held small pride marches (Muhumuza 2014), and the movement has given 
given birth to prominent Kuchu activists like David Kato, who managed to garner a 
substantial amount of international fame for his LGBTQ activism prior to his death 
 Kuchu is a label gay Ugandans attribute to themselves.31
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(Gettleman 2011). Is this episode of governmental persecution the cause of the 
materialization of Uganda’s pro-kuchu movement? This seems questionable. 
 Episodes of persecution from the media or social discrimination may also warrant 
brief periods of retaliatory activism. This is because the media are a powerful institution. 
They are both socially and psychologically influential on multiple levels. Media has the 
capacity to prime individuals and influence their standards of judgment by using a variety 
of manipulative strategies (see Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1993; McCombs 2004; Palau 
and Davesa 2013; Miles 2013). Moreover, media institutions in the MENA are often 
complicit with governmental persecution of marginalized groups. The media may cause 
social blowback by vilifying disadvantaged groups and further contributing to their 
persecution by encouraging societal homophobia. “EXPOSED!”	  was the headline of 
Ugandan’s tabloid newspaper, Red Pepper, a media organization that published lists 
containing names and photographs of individuals that were either gay, lesbian, or 
suspected of being gay (Abedine and Landau 2014). This publication reinforced the need 
for political mobilization of Uganda’s gay community, but once again, it is questionable 
whether a direct line can be drawn from these episodes of persecution to the emergence 
of gay rights movements.  
The Political Liberalization Hypothesis 	   Extraordinarily repressive regimes will not likely be conducive to environments 
that allow for the augmentation of many types of movements.	  As a result, semi-
democratic, illiberal, and to a lesser extent, anocratic regimes will be more inclined to 
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allow activists to protest as a means of cultivating both domestic and international 
legitimacy even if a government is not sympathetic to a group’s predicament. Allowing 
individuals to partake in protests will signal to citizens and external observers that they 
embrace pluralism. Seeing as how the barriers to entry for activists will be lower in these 
regimes, movements may materialize because, as rational actors, members of 
disadvantaged groups will have nothing to lose if they are already persecuted and project 
that a minimal payoff by engaging in political activism.  
 Though the expansion of political participation will not allow new political parties 
and social movements to obtain much political power, they do still arise nonetheless. 
With respect to the three main cases in this thesis, Tunisia has not undergone political 
liberalization under Ben Ali, whereas both Morocco and Algeria have, albeit 
incrementally. Therefore it must be determined whether LGBTQ movements emerged in 
Morocco and Algeria as a direct result of these changes, because admittedly, an 
underlying level of freedom is required in order for LGBTQ movements to exist in these 
countries, but whether gradual political liberalization over decades can catalyze gay 
rights movements—which have augmented since their inception—seems questionable. 
These questions will be addressed in the following chapter.  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Chapter 6 
Explaining Variation in the Strength of Movements !!!!!!!!! !
 I use a most similar systems research design (MSSD) to assess variation in the 
strength of movements between Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. A most similar systems 
design (see Charrad's 2001) is a qualitative research methodology that controls for 
independent variables that may explain variation in the dependent variable through case 
selection. Given that all three of the selected cases share cultural, religious, ethnic, racial, 
and linguistic similarities, variation in the dependent variable cannot be attributed to 
these factors. Charrad utilizes the MSSD research design to explain why family codes are 
more conservative in Morocco and Algeria than in Tunisia. She finds that the level of 
solidarity among tribal groupings and state strength will be the main determinants (Ibid, 
401) . Weaker states with stronger tribes will have more conservative family codes, 32
while stronger states with weaker tribes will have more liberal family codes (Ibid).  
 My case selection, much akin to Charrad’s, is also contingent on variation 
between three similar states. Both Algeria and Morocco have fairly large LGBTQ rights 
movements (though the latter is larger), whereas a gay rights movement did not emerge in 
 The digital [Kindle] version is referenced. Page numbers will vary from the printed editions.32
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Tunisia until after it underwent democratization. The fact that these movements emerged 
in the more culturally conservative states (Morocco and Algeria), but not in Tunisia, one 
of the most socially liberal states in the region, is perplexing. These dissimilarities (in 
otherwise comparable states) make it evident that the MSSD methodology is the most 
pragmatic research design considering the nature of these three cases. 
 The Tunisian LGBTQ community is comparatively less repressed than most other 
states in the region, hence it is logical to expect a more sizable community of gay rights 
activists in Tunisia rather than Morocco or Algeria, but that is not the case. Did the 
regime change facilitate the emergence of the movement? If this is the case LGBTQ 
activism should not have emerged in Morocco or Algeria. Therefore, one of two 
remaining factors must explain this variation: (i) gradual political liberalization in 
Morocco and Algeria, but not in Tunisia, and (ii) varying degrees of internet access and 
internet freedom between all three states. What must be understood is (a) why LGBTQ 
movements did not emerge in Tunisia until after it democratized, and (b) why the strength 
of Morocco’s LGBTQ movement is stronger than Algeria’s. An explanation for these 
differences will yield an answer to my primary research question: what is the catalyst for 
LGBTQ equality movements in culturally conservative and politically repressive 
authoritarian regimes?  
Variation in Movement Strength is Not Due to Political Liberalization  
 The dependent variable—existence/strength of LGBTQ movements—is 
conspicuous in that it varies across these three cases. One may initially posit that 
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democratization alone may sufficiently catalyze a movement, but if democratization is a 
factor, this does not explain why Morocco and Algeria have such sizable LGBTQ 
movements even though their regimes have not changed (see Figures 6.1, 6.2). One 
variable in particular stands out and likely accounts for a significant proportion of 
variation in the dependent variable: level of access to the internet. Still, an underlying 
level of political freedom is required for any activism to exist at all. Therefore it will be 
beneficial to disentangle political liberalization from internet access to see which was 
more important to the emergence of the Moroccan and Algerian LGBTQ movements. 
 Political liberalization is the expansion of political participation. This entails 
loosening of prohibitions that bar particular types of political parties from running for 
office, allowing public protests, and more inclusionary policies with respect to political 
participation. When it comes to political liberalization states may only be inclined to 
expand political participation minimally, but democratization involves a total transfer of 
centralized power from a dictator, military, or political party to the populace (see 
Schumpeter 1950). The expansion of political participation is extended to everyone in 
democracies along with protections on civil rights and civil liberties (see Dahl 1971; Ibid,  
1989; Schedler 2002). 
Political Liberalization in Morocco 
 States have an incentive to liberalize in order to cultivate domestic (as well as 
international) legitimacy and to extend regime longevity. Joffé (2014) explains that 
political liberalization has been a gradual process in Morocco that has occurred since the 
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‘80s. In the early 2000s 
substantial social progress was 
made. Laws surrounding women’s 
rights became more equitable due 
to updates to the Moroccan family 
code, and the King also 
championed policies to ameliorate 
poverty (Ibid). Political participation has also expanded. Legislative elections occur in 
Morocco, but the executive branch is held by the King and remains uncontested. The 
Party of Justice and Development, which is a moderate Islamic opposition party, 
maintains control over Morocco’s bicameral legislature, but many contend they are only a 
pseudo-opposition party and pose no real threat to the King’s monopoly on power 
(Mekhennet and Baume 2011). A diverse array of political parties are allowed to run, 
though the monarchy has been successful at co-opting most political opponents (Joffé 
2014), so the prospect of substantive political reform or a change in the power structure is 
unlikely. 
 When it comes to the materialization of gay rights movements, is it possible that 
their existence can be attributed to gradual political liberalization? The year when gay 
rights activism became prominent in Morocco was approximately 2005 , but according 33
to Polity IV (2014b, Figure 6.1) the Moroccan regime was consistently autocratic with a 
 This is the year in which Morocco’s first gay rights organization was founded. 33
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score of -6 until 2011, when Polity IV upgraded them to -4. Prior to this change in 
ranking, Polity IV gave them a 1-point increase in 1999 from -7 to -6 (Ibid). Between 
2004 and 2005 Freedom House (2014) upgraded Morocco’s freedom score from 5 to 4.5. 
However, this slight increase in freedom did not open a window for LGBTQ activism to 
emerge, as Freedom House (2005) 
attributes this increase to the 
reformation of Morocco’s family 
codes in 2004, which granted women 
extensive rights. The reformation of 
Moroccan family law did not benefit 
members of the LGBTQ community  34
or increase their net level of freedom. 
Morocco has not received a higher score from Freedom House since 2005, and Polity 
IV’s 2011 regime upgrade occurred after its LGBTQ movement was well underway. 
Therefore it can be concluded that political liberalization was not a factor that catalyzed 
its LGBTQ movement since any significant political changes that took place did not open 
the doors for LGBTQ activism. Furthermore, the time periods wherein significant 
political changes occurred were far removed from the time in which LGBTQ activism 
emerged.  
!
 Of course, lesbian and bisexual cis-women benefited due to increased levels of gender equality, but it did 34
not further their ability to practice homosexuality, nor did it help the LGBTQ cause in any way.
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Political Liberalization in Algeria 
 Much like Morocco, Algeria has also liberalized gradually. Though multi-party 
elections now occur, Algeria is largely a single-party dominant regime. The National 
Liberation Front (FLN) has a long held monopoly on political power that it has yet to 
relinquish. Unlike Morocco’s executive branch, Algerian presidents must compete in 
presidential elections, but Freedom House (2013) indicates that these contests are 
fraudulent and that opposing candidates frequently withdraw from races in protest due to 
corrupt results.  
 In spite of increased liberalization, primarily in the form of allowing opposition 
candidates to run for president, Algeria’s Freedom House ranking has consistently 
remained at 5.5 since 1999 (see Figure 6.2). Between 2005 and 2006 Polity IV upgraded 
Algeria’s regime from -3 to 2, which is a 5-point difference (see Figure 6.1). However, 
this did not open a window for LGBTQ activism to emerge. Polity IV (2010) attributes 
the upgrade to increased transparency during the 2004 presidential election. Moreover, 
LGBTQ activism did not become prevalent until approximately 2009, which is after 
internet penetration finally surpassed 10% (Internet World Stats 2012b, see Figure 6.4). 
Therefore it does not appear as though liberalization has caused an Algerian gay rights 
movement to emerge, nor has it ameliorated social biases against the LGBTQ 
community. The years in which Polity IV and Freedom House upgraded Algeria’s regime/
freedom scores are distant from the emergence of its LGBTQ movement.  The most 35
 Which is in approximately the late ‘00s, when its first gay rights organization emerged.35
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recent scoring change by Polity IV (in 2006, see Figure 6.1) was due to greater election 
transparency, so there is no reason to believe this would directly impact the emergence of 
a gay rights movement. 
Democratization in Tunisia 
 Tunisia was consistently authoritarian by both Polity IV and Freedom House 
standards until the revolution (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for reference). They did not receive 
their first score upgrade until 2011; from 6 to 3.5 by Freedom House (2015) and from -4 
to 7 by Polity IV (2014a). Prior to democratization Tunisians were prohibited from 
engaging in political activism. Lutterback describes Ben Ali’s regime as “a police state 
par excellence,” which made it difficult for movements of all types to become politically 
active (2013, 1). Significant political liberalization was the result of democratization in 
Tunisia. Once Tunisia democratized (and subsequently liberalized politically) a variety of 
movements came about including a Salafist movement, which was legally barred from 
existing under the previous regime (Blackshaw 2012). Seeing that the timing of the 
Tunisian LGBTQ movement’s emergence coincided with democratization, it would be 
easy to attribute the emergence of LGBTQ activism to the regime change. This assertion 
is incorrect, however, as it omits nuanced details. 
 The democratization argument, though logical, has two main problems. First, the 
social climate for gays and transgender individuals did not change upon democratization. 
While political activists of all stripes—from communists to Salafists—made their 
political agendas public due to a society-wide inclination to embrace pluralism (seeing as 
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how social solidarity made the revolution possible in the first place), the LGBTQ 
community was perhaps the single group whose views remained marginalized after the 
revolution (Ibid).  
 Second, while other new movements such as the Salafist Ansar al-Sharia group, 
for example, also emerged at approximately the same time as the Tunisian LGBTQ 
movement, Ansar al-Sharia has participated in multiple public demonstrations with 
upwards of 100 people (see Al Jazeera 2013; Al Arabiya News 2014), whereas gay rights 
groups in Tunisia such as LGBTI Tunisien or Kelmty have only been able to participate 
in online forms of activism. Even though Tunisia has liberalized quite considerably, 
Tunisian gay rights activists such as Ben Issa and Khaled Azouzi have argued that the 
social climate is still too hostile for gays to be public about their political agenda 
(Blackshaw 2012), hence the need for the internet. Without it the LGBTQ movement 
would not exist in Tunisia. Furthermore, if political liberalization is not what catalyzed 
gay rights movements in Morocco and Algeria there is no reason to believe it could do so 
in Tunisia. 
 Political liberalization and democratization are useful for the materialization of 
social movements only insofar as there is at least a minimal level of social acceptability 
for the cause. This is not the case for homosexuality, which is why the internet—as 
opposed to an abolishment of institutional restrictions on activism via liberalization or 
democratization—explains the existence of LGBTQ activism in Tunisia. If one could 
attribute the emergence of Tunisia’s gay rights movement to liberalization and 
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democratization, one would expect them to be on par with other new movements in terms 
of strength, but that is not the case. The expansion of political participation in Tunisia 
was conducive to the emergence of religious, secular, and other ideologically divisive 
groups (such as communists), but not gay rights groups. Though a gay rights movement 
exists now, Tunisian activists have not coordinated public demonstrations. Any and all 
gay rights activism is still forced to remain online due to the unwelcoming nature of 
Tunisia’s social climate; ergo, democratization and political liberalization does not appear 
to be beneficial to LGBTQ activists. What does facilitate the emergence of gay rights 
movements is the internet and citizens’ ability to use it for political purposes. 
The Internet’s Key Role in the Variation of LGBTQ Movement Strength 
Variation I: Why Did Activism Not Exist in Tunisia Until After Democratization? 
 Looking solely at internet penetration rates (IPR) in Morocco, Algeria, and 
Tunisia it is evident all states are relatively comparable at first glance. Data from CIA 
World Factbook (2014a; 2014b) indicates Morocco has the highest IPR at 40.1%. Tunisia 
comes in second with an IPR of 32%, and Algeria’s is a modest 12.1% (see Table 2.4), 
Data from Internet World Stats—though a bit older—indicates slightly higher IPRs for 
each country; 49% in Morocco (2012a), 17.2% in Algeria (2012b), and 32% in Tunisia 
(2012c) [see Figure 6.3]. Raw percentages are somewhat misleading when it comes to 
why LGBTQ activism did not emerge in Tunisia. A more substantive examination of the 
level of freedom citizens have to use the internet is required.  
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  Figure 6.3: Internet Penetration Rate (IPR) Growth 
Source: Internet World Stats 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; *CIA World Factbook 2014a; 2014b. 
 In the event 100% of the population had access to the internet it would not serve 
as a viable political utility unless citizens were able to use it freely—that is—there is only 
minimal amounts of governmental interference or restrictions on websites (especially 
ones used for mobilization purposes such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube or their 
regional equivalents), or citizens have the ability to easily bypass these restrictions. An 
in-depth examination reveals precisely why a Tunisian LGBTQ movement never took off 
under Ben Ali; because the Tunisian government was successful at suppressing citizens’ 
freedom on the internet. This has not been the case in Morocco and Algeria. 
 Freedom House (2014) ranked Tunisia’s overall internet freedom as “not free” in 
2011—their last year as an authoritarian regime. Using a 100-point scale, Freedom House 
scored Tunisia’s overall internet freedom 81 out of 100 in 2011 (with 1 denoting total 
freedom and 100 signaling a complete lack thereof) and explains how there were 
limitations on content, censorship of political bloggers, and punishment for internet users 
!76
that sought to engage in online political activism (Freedom House 2011). It was not 
uncommon for the Tunisian government to stringently censor content on the internet and 
restrict access to websites of the regime’s choice.  
 There was a four-year window when the internet could have been relatively useful 
as a political tool in Tunisia; particularly between the time infrastructure for broadband 
was being built  in 2005 up until 2009, which is when the government began to 36
crackdown on the dissemination of user-created content once internet penetration 
increased (Ibid). Internet access was likely not sufficient to catalyze a gay rights 
movement by 2005, and once more citizens finally gained access to the internet their 
ability to freely use it was restricted. Ben Ali likely saw the internet as a threat to his 
regime. As internet penetration increased, so too did censorship. Incremental losses in 
internet freedom was correlated with growth in penetration rates according to Freedom 
House (2011). There were restrictions to websites that are critical for political 
mobilization such as YouTube and Facebook. That was not the case with Morocco and 
Algeria. What has changed since 2011 in Tunisia is its level of internet freedom. As of 
2012 Freedom House (2014) upgraded Tunisia’s internet freedom ranking to “partly free” 
once much of the restrictions were abolished and censorship dissipated after Ben Ali fled 
the country.  
 Though Freedom House does not report levels of internet freedom in Algeria (and 
did not report on internet freedom in Morocco until 2013 [see Freedom House 2014]), 
 Broadband is important namely because faster speeds will allow for uploads/downloads of larger files, 36
such as images and videos, which could prove useful for political purposes in order to document 
government abuse and share political messages.
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there is still evidence to suggest citizens in both states enjoyed a much higher degree of 
internet freedom. According to OpenNet Initiative (2009a) the Algerian government 
maintains control over the internet infrastructure, and as a result, it will occasionally 
utilize it as a security apparatus for surveillance purposes, but the Algerian government 
does not filter political and/or social content, nor did it do so once internet penetration 
increased. There are exceptions to this, as the regime attempted to stymie citizens’ access 
to Facebook during the 2011 Arab spring (Ramdani 2011), but this was due to 
extraordinary circumstances and is not the norm.  
 There is also no evidence that the Moroccan government heavily censors content 
on the internet (OpenNet Initiative 2009b). There were particular instances when they 
selectively filtered some content (such as social media and photo board sites), but this is 
also rare and typically out of the norm (OpenNet Initiative 2009b). For all intents and 
purposes, the LGBTQ community in these two states can organize freely online. The 
consequences of this are evident, as gay Moroccans and Algerians capitalized on internet 
freedom (as well as increased access to the internet) to initiate their movements. 
 The idea for Kif-Kif, Morocco’s first formal gay rights organization, manifested 
on an online forum for LGBTQ people (Association Alouen 2011). As the number of 
users grew, members sought to become active in politics by formulating an actual 
organization to represent their interests. Kif-Kif is now considered the leading gay rights 
association in the Maghreb by its sister movement in Algeria (Ibid). LGBTQ activism is 
deeply entrenched with the internet. A majority of LGBTQ-tailored resources—ranging 
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from magazines to online campaigns—are coordinated and stage exclusively online. The 
internet is fundamental to LGBTQ activism in authoritarian regimes, and because gay 
Tunisians were unable to fully take advantage of the access they had to the internet, they 
were unable to engage in activism or forge a gay rights movement. 
Variation II: Why is Morocco’s LGBTQ Movement Slightly Larger Than Algeria’s in Spite 
Equivalent Levels of Internet Freedom in Both Countries? 
 Morocco’s LGBTQ movement is slightly more advanced and active than 
Algeria’s, but this can be explained simply by the fact that Morocco has a higher 
percentage of internet users than Algeria, and additionally, its IPR accelerated more 
speedily than Algeria’s. By the end of 2000 Algeria only had 50,000 internet users 
whereas Morocco had double that amount irrespective of the fact that Algeria has roughly 
six million more citizens than Morocco (Internet World Stats 2014). By 2014 Algeria had 
about 6.7 million internet users, but in contrast, Morocco had four times that amount 
(Ibid). The rapid expansion of internet access in Morocco in comparison to Algeria makes 
two things evident: (i) the Algerian LGBTQ movement emerged several years after 
Morocco’s for the fact that Algeria was slower at increasing citizens’ access to the 
internet, and (ii) Morocco’s LGBTQ movement is slightly more advanced/active than 
Algeria’s because much more people have access to the internet in Morocco than in 
Algeria. Furthermore, around the time LGBTQ activism became more prominent in 
Algeria internet-related factors had recently changed; specifically, internet access became 
more widely available.  
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 Belson (2014) demonstrates that Algeria’s expansion of broadband infrastructure 
was substantial in 2013; it increased by 1,000% (2). This means few LGBTQ activists 
would no longer be relegated to 56k dial-up and could now navigate more flash-heavy 
websites, which makes political mobilization less challenging. Web 2.0 sites such as 
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube are easily accessible to those with a broadband 
connection. However, broadband users account for a very small portion of total internet 
users in the region; approximately 1-3% in Morocco, 2-4% in Algeria, and 3-5% in 
Tunisia (GSMA 2014, 19). About one in five broadband users in Morocco and Tunisia are 
smartphone users, whereas just one in twenty Algerians access broadband internet 
through smartphones (Ibid).  
 Although IPR statistics are relatively dated, one can expect substantial growth 
when accounting for the introduction of smartphones to the region. The Middle East and 
Africa has, since 2011, had the second-largest user base of mobile phone users in the 
world behind Asia (eMarketer 2013). In 2011 they had 445.6 million users, by 2013 they 
had reached 525.8 million, and are projected to reach 670 million users by 2017 (Ibid). 
Mobile phone speeds of 3G and 4G  have seen a steady increase of penetration in the 37
region overall, but in comparison with Morocco and Tunisia—whose total 3G/4G 
smartphone users accounts for approximately 20% of their total broadband base—the 
proportion of Algeria’s 3G and 4G mobile phone users makes up less than 5% out of its 
entire base of broadband users (GSMA 2014, 19). Much like their internet infrastructure, 
 Speeds above 3G technically qualifies as broadband while 4G is a step up from that. Other options, 37
which are particularly slower, are 2G and lower. The latter speeds are still more common (see GSMA 
2014).
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Morocco is ahead of Algeria and Tunisia when it comes to 3G speeds. Morocco rolled out 
its 3G network in 2007, which explains why the proportion of fixed to non-fixed 
broadband users (that is, those with access through a computer versus a mobile device) is 
higher in Morocco, although Tunisia has been quick to follow due to its small population 
and geographical size (Ibid, 21). Algeria is also slightly behind Morocco and Tunisia 
when it comes to cellphone adoption; 16% of Moroccans and 17% of Tunisians own 
cellular telephones in contrast with only 13% of Algerians (22). 
 Upon an examination of these statistics it becomes clear that the reason 
Morocco’s LGBTQ movement is slightly stronger than Algeria’s is because access to the 
internet is much higher in Morocco. This is expected when accounting for three factors: 
(i) Algeria’s population is larger, thus making it difficult to reach more citizens, (ii) 
geographically, it is larger, which complicates the building of infrastructure, and (iii) its 
population density is fairly consolidated (with an urbanization rate of over 70% [CIA 
World Factbook 2014d]), but there are large pockets of the rural populations dispersed 
throughout the state (see Figure 
6.4). These factors make the 
implementation of broadband more 
difficult. Algeria has a lot more 
ground to cover than its neighbors; 
specifically, 2,381,741 square 
kilometers (Ibid). Even when the 
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infrastructure is built factors such as reliability, speed consistency, and whether websites 
and internet hosts have enough bandwidth to handle heavy traffic will impact activists’ 
ability to mobilize. Once internet penetration rates increase, one can expect its LGBTQ 
movement to become stronger and catch up with Morocco's. 
Summary of Primary Findings 
 When it comes to the role of the internet, it is very evident that the Tunisian 
LGBTQ community was unable to emerge for the fact that they lacked adequate freedom 
to use the internet for political mobilization. Hopkins (2012) explains how Tunisia has 
long been been known as an “enemy of the internet.” Once Tunisia democratized, this 
trend ceased as of 2012, which is the same year LGBTQ activism began to materialize on 
Facebook. What is perceptible is the speed in which LGBTQ movements strengthen once 
they develop. The Algerian LGBTQ movement was insignificant in 2008, but that 
changed by 2009. Until 2014 the Tunisian LGBTQ movement was virtually non-existent, 
but now they have become a moderately organized political faction. Tunisia’s movement 
has only advanced to Tier 2 and will likely become a full-fledged Tier 3 movement in a 
few years time. The strength and growth of these movements will likely continue to 
accelerate upon greater availability of the internet, granted current levels of freedom on 
the web remain consistent. 
  These findings indicate that internet freedom is more important than penetration 
rates for the existence of LGBTQ movements seeing that even though only a small 
portion of Algeria’s total population has access to the internet, a gay rights movement still 
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managed to emerge. However, the overall strength of LGBTQ movements will be 
determined by growth of internet penetration rates. Internet freedom allows gay rights 
movements to exist, whereas IPR rates will determine the strength and size of these 
movements once they materialize. 
 In terms of internet freedom, all three cases examined in this chapter are now on 
par. According to Alexa (2015a) websites that are utilized most frequently for purposes of 
political mobilization (such as social media and video-sharing sites) are incredibly 
popular. Facebook is the second most popular website in Morocco followed by YouTube, 
while Twitter is the 21st most popular website. In Algeria and Tunisia, Facebook is the 
most popular website and YouTube is third most popular (Ibid, 2015b; Similar Web 
2014). Even web content that is thought to contribute to social immorality such as 
pornographic websites are among the most visited sites in these states (Ibid). This 
indicates that Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia all allow for an adequate level of internet 
freedom.  
Conclusion 
 It is clear that variation in the strength of movements is contingent on differences 
between levels of freedom on the internet as well as overall access to it. In Morocco and 
Algeria LGBTQ individuals were able to use the internet freely to mobilize, but in 
contrast, the Tunisian government heavily blocked content and prohibited websites that 
could potentially be used for purposes of political mobilization. Once Tunisia 
democratized and restrictions on internet freedom became more lax, LGBTQ activism 
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emerged almost immediately. This is a very important finding that has significant 
implications on sociological and political science research for social movements.  
 Additionally, the Moroccan LGBTQ movement is more strong and active than 
Algeria’s, but this is due to greater availability and access to the internet in Morocco. The 
strength of movements is clearly correlated with the level of access activists have to the 
internet (see examples in Figure 6.5, modeled after Tammen [2000], 22-23: Figures 1.9 
and 1.10). This finding unequivocally validates the internet mobilization hypothesis. The 
internet was the sole factor that varied across all of these cases, and once internet 
conditions changed, so too did the dependent variable. 
Figure 6.5: Illustration of Movement Strength Crossed by Internet Trends 
 With respect to the social blowback and political liberalization hypotheses, there 
is a lack of evidence to support both of them. Repression and activism are correlated, but 
there is no evidence a causal relationship exists. Although there are often intense episodes 
of persecution waged against LGBTQ communities in these states—especially in 
Morocco—the overall level of repression against the LGBTQ community has remained 
!84
consistent, so it seems unlikely that episodes of persecution would alone catalyze 
activism. Episodes of persecution would undoubtedly quantify existing motivations to 
initiate a gay rights movement, but there is insufficient evidence to suggest it suffices as a 
catalyst for LGBTQ activism in Morocco, Algeria, or Tunisia.  
 When it comes to the political liberalization hypothesis, it does not yield much 
explanatory value in the three aforementioned cases. Political liberalization in Morocco 
and Algeria did not open new doors for LGBTQ activists, nor did it occur in a time frame 
that coincides with the emergence of their gay rights movements. Increased liberalization 
due to democratization in Tunisia also does not explain the emergence of the Tunisian 
LGBTQ movement. Though it is true that LGBTQ activism emerged after Tunisia 
democratized and consequentially liberalized, Morocco and Algeria did not democratize 
and still witnessed the materialization of LGBTQ rights movements. Also, other 
movements have flourished since democratization in Tunisia and frequently participate in 
public protests, but LGBTQ activists are still unable to do this for the time being. The 
liberalization hypothesis may explain why movements for other types of postmaterialist 
causes exist in authoritarian regimes, but it does not explain the emergence of gay rights 
movements in this small-N study and will not likely be applicable to LGBTQ movements 
in other MENA states. Insofar as the three cases in this chapter are concerned, the internet 
mobilization hypothesis best explains variation in the strength and existence of 
movements. 
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 This analysis shows that highly taboo causes such as gay equality movements are 
able to exist and even thrive in authoritarian regimes in the MENA due to the arrival of 
new political resources that give them the ability to covertly mobilize online and engage 
in activism anonymously. Government censorship stymied any and all activism from 
occurring online in Tunisia, but once citizens were granted the ability to use the internet 
freely, LGBTQ activists were able to construct advocacy-oriented pages on social media 
websites and ultimately formed a gay rights movement.  
 Furthermore, though Morocco and Algeria both have fairly large gay rights 
movements, Morocco’s is slightly larger. Alouen, one of Algeria’s leading gay rights 
groups, refers to the Moroccan gay rights organization Kif-Kif as the leading LGBTQ 
organization in the Maghreb (Association Alouen 2011), and for good reason. Morocco’s 
collective LGBTQ movement is more sizable and active because the eligibility pool of 
gay citizens that are able to engage in activism is larger simply due to having more access 
to the internet. Conversely, many Algerians do not have access to the internet in spite of 
adequate internet freedom; however, enough citizens have access for a Tier 3 LGBTQ 
movement to exist. These findings draw us to the following conclusion: internet freedom 
as well as access to the internet catalyzes LGBTQ movements in authoritarian regimes 
because gay citizens can avoid social persecution and directly engage in anonymous 
activism due to their ability to clandestinely organize. 
 Now that a comprehensive evaluation has been done it is easer to answer the main 
research question of this thesis; what causes gay rights movements to emerge in 
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authoritarian regimes in the MENA? They emerge when new political opportunities 
materialize—in this case it was the internet. The internet gave LGBTQ activists in 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia a safe conduit to engage in activism. For this reason, it is 
now known that LGBTQ movements require the internet and internet freedom to exist in 
conservative, politically repressive states. 
Other Arguments 
 There are three other potential arguments that counter the internet mobilization 
hypothesis. These arguments must be addressed in order to hold that the internet 
mobilization hypothesis maintains validity. The first posits that the internet is not the de 
facto method of mobilization for LGBTQ activists in the MENA region since public pro-
gay rights demonstrations have taken place in Lebanon; therefore, gay rights activism 
must not be contingent on the internet. Instead, the internet merely simplifies the process 
by making mobilization and collective action more streamlined. Second, one cannot 
identify a ‘tipping point’ wherein internet access/freedom became prominent enough to 
allow for the emergence of a gay rights movement. Third, as M. Roberts’ (1995) 
hypothesis predicts, the LGBTQ communities—mostly men—in Morocco and Tunisia 
are disproportionately impacted by HIV/AIDS in comparison to heterosexuals (Mumtaz 
et al. 2011), therefore this crisis may have catalyzed a gay rights movement, not the 
internet. 
Argument I: The Role of Internet in Gay Rights Protests 
!87
 The first argument contends that the internet is not essential to LGBTQ activism 
in the MENA region, otherwise public demonstrations by gay rights advocates in 
Lebanon would not have occurred. Instead, the internet is most commonly used by 
LGBTQ activists only because it makes political mobilization and coordination easier. 
The latter component of this counter argument is accurate. The internet has opened the 
doors for all types of activism. Even existing feminist movements have adopted online 
campaign strategies to pressure governments. For instance, Saudi feminists now annually 
initiate calls to defy the female driving ban by devising coordinated hashtag campaigns 
on Twitter and by uploading videos of themselves driving to YouTube (Naar 2013). There 
is no reason to doubt the utility of the internet as a tool for activists; however, this counter 
argument falls apart quickly upon further inspection. 
 The case of public demonstrations by LGBTQ activists in Lebanon is wholly 
isolated. Although Moroccan LGBTQ activists, for example, have transcended their 
online roots, any and all demonstrations or marches occur abroad. Even its chief LGBTQ 
organization, Kif-Kif, is not headquartered in Morocco, but instead resides in Spain. The 
Algerian LGBTQ Facebook group, Union des Gays et Lesbiennes en Algérie, was able to 
successfully mobilize a domestic public protest only to the extent that candles were used 
as surrogates for the activists themselves (Afrol News 2010). Public demonstrations—
while they are not impossible—are highly unlikely given the social climate in these 
states. Nevertheless, if one had to select a state whereby the likelihood for a public 
demonstration is greater, Lebanon would be it. 
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 Lebanon, much akin to Israel and Turkey, is unique in that homosexuality is 
comparatively less controversial there. Pew Research Center (2013) indicates that 
Lebanon is one of the least hostile countries in the region towards the notion of 
homosexuality; 18% of respondents believe “society should accept homosexuality.” This 
is in contrast with many other states such as Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and the Palestinian 
Territories where four percent or less believe homosexuality should be accepted (Ibid). 
This reveals that nearly one in five Lebanese individuals are accepting of the LGBTQ 
community, thus signaling that public demonstrations—though not the preeminent 
method—will not be entirely out of the question. Given the large amount of Lebanese 
citizens that accept homosexuality, this also indicates a substantial proportion of that 
support comes from heterosexuals, which implies the social climate is more hospitable to 
gays in Lebanon. Moreover, according to Freedom House (2015) Lebanon is one of few 
states in the region considered to be “partly free” with an overall score of 4.5. This 
further illustrates that its political climate is distinct in comparison with its neighbors. 
 Even if the conditions in Lebanon were less conducive to the possibility of public 
LGBTQ rights demonstrations occurring, the internet mobilization hypothesis—like all 
hypotheses—is probabilistic and can account for a small margin of error. However, 
Lebanese LGBTQ activism would also not exist without the internet since Helem—the 
region’s first formal gay rights organization and coordinator of Lebanese public protest 
events—exists solely because of it (see Helem 2014). Torbey (2005) writes, “George 
Azzi, the group's co-ordinator [sic], says the idea first came to life in an internet chat 
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room whose members decided to organise an association.” This trend is consistent with 
many other formal gay rights organizations across the region.  
 The internet is still the main conduit for gays rights activism in Lebanon. Informal 
online-based organizations like the Lebanese LGBT Media Monitor mobilized effective 
online campaigns through Twitter such as the #HammamRaid and #NoMoreRaids in an 
effort to raise awareness of instances of legal persecution against individuals in 
attendance of LGBTQ-friendly clubs (Littauer 2014). Still, the internet mobilization 
hypothesis does not contend that LGBTQ activism cannot ever transcend its online roots
—because that is certainly a possibility—but the initial formulation of gays rights 
movements in authoritarian regimes is contingent on access to the internet and web 
freedom. The success of the movement will dictate how long it will be restricted to the 
online sphere. 
Argument II: Lack of Accuracy 
 The second argument confronts the fact that it is fairly difficult to pinpoint an 
exact percentage in which internet penetration becomes sufficient for the emergence of 
LGBTQ activism. Such an argument is premised on the false assumption that activism 
will emerge immediately following increased access to the internet. Even in the event it 
were the case that a tipping point—a percentage in which internet penetration becomes 
sufficient to catalyze gay rights movements—could be identified, there would be a great 
deal of planning and coordination on behalf of activists, which would take time, thus 
implying the emergence would be delayed by a couple of years. However, once internet 
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penetration becomes sufficient, by the time a gay rights movement emerges and is visible 
the IPR would likely change. Another reason it is difficult to identify a precise tipping 
point is because MENA internet stats are not released annually. For these reasons, 
pinpointing a precise IPR percentage is onerous. 
 With the case with Kelmty, an informal gay rights organization in Tunisia, it did 
not emerge immediately following the revolution. Ben Ali was ousted in early 2011, but 
the Kelmty Facebook page was not created until 2012. In 2014 it attained 1,500 likes, and 
by 2015 it finally reached over 2,500 likes and established an official website that directs 
traffic to its bevy of social media links. It can only recently be classified as an informal 
organization. This is a seemingly appropriate time frame—two to three years—to discern 
whether newly created Facebook groups will morph into informal organizations. LGBTQ 
activism in Algeria had a slow start, but received a boost due to a number of changes in 
factors related to internet access (increased internet penetration, expansion of broadband, 
and growth of mobile phone use). 
 Lastly, specification of an exact percentage of internet access that is required to 
catalyze LGBTQ movements is unnecessary. Its absence does not detract from the overall 
validity of the internet mobilization hypothesis. Ascertaining truth about the cause-effect 
relationship between the internet and LGBTQ activism is what matters most. In the event 
change in either (a) the existence of gay rights movements, or (b) an increase/decrease in 
a movement’s strength occurs, one can verify that the internet is the cause by observing 
whether factors such as internet access or internet freedom has also changed.  
!91
Argument III: HIV/AIDS as an Alternate Explanation 
 Finally, M. Roberts (1995) states that regimes in developing countries fail to 
target HIV prevention programs towards its LGBTQ communities (248), thus creating an 
inadvertent gap in knowledge of safe-sex practices within the community. A lack of safe-
sex knowledge almost always overwhelmingly impacts younger demographics. Omission 
of safe-sex practices in HIV prevention programs for same-sex intercourse is likely 
dependent on a regime’s aversion to or outright denial of the existence of homosexuality. 
This has been the case in Iran and Russia (see Penketh 2008; Sieczkowski 2014). It may 
also be because providing such information to gay communities could potentially be seen 
as a tacit endorsement or legitimization of homosexuality, which may not be culturally 
permissible. Failure to provide safe-sex education to LGBTQ communities will lead to a 
greater concentration of those infected within that community (M. Roberts 1995, 248).  
 This is a reasonable operating hypothesis, however, it is incredibly difficult to 
control for sexual orientation when attempting to gauge the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in 
these states. Infection rates among adults between the ages of 15 and 49-years-old are 
relatively low in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Approximately only .10% of citizens in 
these states are infected (CIA World Factbook 2014c; Sufian 2004). Evidence does 
suggest that of those few that are infected in the region, gay and bisexual men are 
impacted disproportionately by HIV/AIDS for the fact that male-to-male sexual contact 
(MSM) increases one’s chances of becoming infected, statistically speaking (Mumtaz et 
al. 2011).  
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 A sample size of 1,778 individuals indicates that the rate of infection among gay 
and/or bisexual males in Tunisia is exceedingly high at 4.6%—which is nearly one in 
twenty gay men—although this percentage is lower than the likes of Egypt, Iran, 
Pakistan, and Sudan (Ibid, 6). A much smaller sample size of 90 gay/bisexual men in 
Morocco indicates that the rate of infection among them is 4.4% (Ibid). This is high as 
well, but the sample size is too small to hold weight. Data on HIV/AIDS prevalence 
among Algeria’s gay community was not collected. 
 Due to the lack of gay activism under Ben Ali’s repressive regime, it seems 
improbable that a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among gay and bisexual men would 
alone catalyze a gay rights movement. If this were the case, assuming the infection rates 
have remained high among gay and bisexual men, a movement would have likely 
emerged sooner in order to combat it from spreading further. That is not to say gay/
bisexual men did not desire to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS in their community, but 
they likely opted not to in order to avoid persecution or being outed. Therefore M. 
Roberts’ hypothesis—if it could be validated—would not necessarily diminish the 
internet’s role in catalyzing gay rights movements no more than the social blowback 
hypothesis would. Like periods of persecution, HIV/AIDS may enhance existing 
motivations to engage in activism, but it would not give activists the ability to mobilize.  
 If it were the case that there was an increased prevalence of HIV/AIDS among 
gay communities in the MENA, it would be added to a long catalog of reasons why 
political mobilization of the LGBTQ community is all the more necessary, but the 
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opportunity to engage in activism (which is most important) will ultimately be dependent 
on access to the internet, not AID/AIDS. M Roberts’ hypothesis, in part, follows the new 
social movement line of reasoning, but that theory is more appropriate for explaining why 
LGBTQ activism emerges in democratic and/or nominally democratic regimes. 
Furthermore, M. Roberts’ hypothesis is not inclusive of gay and bisexual women, so it 
cannot explain why they also participate in LGBTQ activism in authoritarian states since 
he purports that gay men are the only ones impacted by HIV or AIDS. If this were 
applicable to the MENA, we should expect only gay and bisexual men to fight for gay 
rights, but that is not the reality. The internet mobilization hypothesis explains why all 
members of the LGBTQ community engage in activism in authoritarian regimes. 
 Overall, there is an insufficient amount of evidence to support M. Roberts’ HIV/
AIDS hypothesis. That is not to say it is not relevant elsewhere, but it cannot be proven 
that HIV/AIDS single-handedly catalyzed LGBTQ movements in Tunisia or Morocco. If 
it could, one would have expected to see the materialization of LGBTQ activism prior to 
democratization in Tunisia and liberalization in Morocco. This hypothesis is more suited 
for democracies or nominally democratic regimes seeing that it rests on the assumption 
that gay rights movements are able to emerge in any social climate, but that is not the 
case. It is new political opportunities (i.e. the internet) that explains the existence of gay 
rights movements in authoritarian regimes.  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Chapter 7 
Conclusion & Implications for Social Movement Research !!!!!!!!!!
 This graduate thesis supports the claim that new political resources affords actors 
in authoritarian regimes the opportunity to engage in activism. Greater availability and 
freedom on the internet explains variation in the strength and existence of LGBTQ 
movements in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Upon further political liberalization in all 
three states, gay rights activists were still unable to engage in more orthodox methods of 
activism (e.g. public demonstrations, lobbying politicians, activism via proxy groups such 
as human rights organizations, NGOS, unions, or Islamic associations) due to the nature 
of their causes. The internet was the one conduit with which they were able to convey 
their message. This finding should change the way sociologists and political scientists 
think about social movements. The ability of activists to politically mobilize is a key 
factor when it comes to why movements emerge. 
 The prospect of equality for sex and gender minorities is too contentious in these 
states for activists to be open about their political ambitions. They lack political allies to 
fight on their behalf. Civil rights advocacy groups in the region, by and large, have been 
unwilling to take up LGBTQ causes. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights has 
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publicly distanced themselves from gay rights activists for “religious and cultural 
reasons” (Masriya 2014). Such a move may not have been influenced by homophobia, 
but associating themselves with gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender individuals 
would most certainly detract from their domestic legitimacy, which could impact their 
funding and put them in direct opposition with governments, thus threatening their 
existence. As a result, most domestic groups will avoid adopting gay rights platforms. 
This leaves members of the LGBTQ community to fend for themselves. The internet has 
provided them cover in Middle Eastern and North African states. It allows them to stake 
their claim in politics without the fear of retribution from social conservatives, religious 
fundamentalists, anti-gay homophobes, or the state. A brief examination of other cases 
indicates the internet plays a fundamental role in LGBTQ movements not just in 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, but throughout the region as well. 
A Brief Overview of Other LGBTQ Movements in the MENA 
 Lack of an in-depth examination of variables such as regime type, political 
freedom, internet penetration rates, freedom on the net, and smartphone usage will not 
produce a nuanced understanding of LGBTQ movements in the region. However, seeing 
as how it has been established that the internet plays a key role in gay rights activism in 
the Middle East and North Africa, a brief overview of the methods employed by other 
LGBTQ activists will still be fruitful in order to demonstrate the overall importance of 
the internet to their cause. 
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 Twitter is highly valuable to gay rights activists in the MENA. Hashtag 
campaigns are a popular tactic primarily because it raises a great deal of both domestic 
and international attention. Egyptian LGBTQ activists have initiated the 
“#SolidaritywithEgyptLGBT”	  and “#StopJailingGays” hashtag campaigns	  (Sheils 2014; 
Feder 2014). In Lebanon the Lebanese LGBT Media Monitor, an online organization, has 
been instrumental at coordinating effective hashtag campaigns such as the 
#HammamRaid and #NoMoreRaids in an effort to raise awareness of raids on gay-
friendly night clubs (Littauer 2014). These campaigns are mostly initiated by informal 
organizations that exclusively exist online. These types of advocacy groups have become 
increasingly common. The aforementioned Lebanese LGBT Media Monitor has attained 
a significant amount of visibility. Multiple informal online-exclusive organizations have 
also materialized in Egypt: “Arabs4Tolerance”	  and “GayEgypt”	  being two with arguably 
the most exposure (Masriya 2014). 
 The LGBTQ movement in Iran, akin to all other movements in the MENA region, 
was also initiated online (see “Iranian Queer Organization”	  2015). Queer Iranians have 
constructed both formal and informal organizations and have also co-opted domestic and 
international allies, but activism via social media is the tactic they use most frequently. In 
2011 gay and lesbian Iranians uploaded videos of themselves sharing their stories of legal 
and social persecution (Cohen 2011). Moreover, Tehran’s gay community uploaded 
photographs of themselves with rainbow flags and anti-homophobia signs to an Iranian 
social networking website (Fisher 2012). Informal organizations that maintain a strong 
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presence online have acquired appreciable followings. The Facebook group “Yes People! 
We Do Exist!”	  was created in 2012 and has accumulated nearly 6,000 likes (see “Yes 
People! We Do Exist!”	  2015). Iran’s LGBTQ movement also relies exclusively on the 
internet for domestic activism. This is consistent with other LGBTQ groups in the region. 
Public demonstrations and pride marches are not an option unless they transpire outside 
of Iranian territory. 
 Notably, the internet is censored quite heavily in Iran, and as a result, these 
restrictions may prevent its LGBTQ movement from becoming too powerful (Lee 2013). 
Irrespectively, a gay rights movement was able to materialize for the fact that many 
citizens, if not most, are able to circumvent governmental firewalls by using a variety of 
popular software applications that either mask their IP addresses or generate foreign ones 
by using VPNs (Ibid). Even though the Iranian government blocks access to popular 
social networking websites like Facebook (Eremenko 2013), many Iranians are still able 
to access it according to Lee. For those unable to bypass government censorship, 
domestic social networking websites such as Joopea are viable alternatives for LGBTQ 
activists. Gay rights activists in other states with heavy restrictions on internet freedom 
such as Saudi Arabia (Stern 2014) have not been as successful as Iranians at 
circumventing governmental restrictions on the internet. The Saudi monarchy has 
increased internet censorship as of late, and because of this one can speculate that a gay 
rights movement will not materialize there anytime soon (Ibid). Notwithstanding some 
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exceptions, many other MENA states have seen the manifestation of LGBTQ rights 
movements. 
 If these movements are becoming more common, why are they ignored by social 
scientists? Gay rights activism in authoritarian regimes likely does not get attention for 
three reasons: (i) their movements are comparatively small in contrast with other regional 
political groups, thereby making them difficult to measure, (ii) information on them is 
sparse, and (iii) there is a common misconception that either (a) these movements do not 
exist, or (b) that Western conceptions of homosexuality are foreign to the region.  
Why Social Scientists Should Not Forego the Study of Gay Rights in the MENA 
 The latter cultural relativist claim is made by Bradley (2010). He critiques 
“Western-style gays rights activism”	  in the Middle East and North Africa by stating that it 
“creates more problems than it solves, if any”	  (250). This may be true with respect to the 
social backlash spawned by the emergence of these groups, but Bradley’s argument rests 
on a fundamental misunderstanding of human sexuality. He, in effect, equates male 
homosexuality to pedophilia, alleging that it is culturally permissible and claims that it 
“could be fairly described as universal”	  (242), particularly in Morocco. He says it is 
common for Moroccan men to engage in sexual acts with prepubescent boys as a means 
of preserving female purity until marriage (238-9). He holds that this practice, to which 
he refers to as “pederasty”	  (referring to sex between a man and a boy), is relatively 
socially acceptable (238) and contends that the push for gay rights has inadvertently 
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jeopardized the social acceptability of pederasty, as it “threaten[s] the peaceful social 
harmony.”	  (243). He writes, 
Pederasty in the Arab world remains as ubiquitous as the call to prayer. So long 
as the sexual behavior is not spoken of publicly, it does not subvert existing 
homosocial norms, and it is not therefore perceived as a threat. The trick seems to 
be to not mention the subject in categorizable terms, not to acknowledge its 
existence if at all possible, and therefore not to have to deal with its distinct 
aspect of social reality. (243). !
This implies that Bradley advocates for the LGBTQ community to stay in the closet in 
order to preserve the practice of pederasty. However, pederasty and/or pedophilia is not 
homosexuality, but instead is a form of child exploitation and abuse. Therefore, Bradley’s 
argument is incorrect because it falsely equates the two. 
 Also, Bradley’s view of homosexuality disregards the existence of lesbianism and 
bisexuality altogether. Bradley’s conception of homosexuality is a gross 
oversimplification and is blatantly derogatory to members of the LGBTQ community. 
Homosexuality refers to one’s attraction to the same sex and is the persistence of 
emotional and physical relationships between two consenting adults of the same sex. 
Studying LGBTQ movements will not “disrupt” the social status quo in the MENA. If 
anything, shedding more light on them will only bolster their movements. Members of 
the LGBTQ community face severe discrimination in the MENA, and as a result, it is 
rational for them to engage in activism granted the opportunity to do so arrises.  
 Homosexuality transcends culture. It is an innate and naturally occurring 
biological phenomenon. Although culture is important in that it “provides guidelines or 
scripts for appropriate sexual responses”	  (Bancroft 2002, 19), cultural criterions for 
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human sexuality does not detract from the plethora of evidence that suggests attraction to 
the same sex is an irreversible human characteristic and may occur for a number of 
reasons that are determined by fetal development (Blanchard 2000) or one’s genetic 
predisposition (see Murphy 2005; Gavrilets & Rice 2009; O’Riordan 2012). Therefore, 
criticism from cultural relativists is unwarranted for the fact that homosexuality is not a 
choice and will be just as prevalent in the Middle East and North Africa as it is in 
Western states regardless of restrictive cultural norms. 
 Whitaker (2006) states, “Arabs nowadays have just too much contact with the rest 
of the world to maintain an isolationist ‘cultural purity’	  approach”	  (224) and adds that 
“exposure to foreign ideas and influences cannot be prevented”	  (212), which explains the 
popularity of the ‘LGBTQ’ acronym in the region. It is an acronym that maintains 
synonymity with the global gay community and encapsulates the totality of people 
participating in the worldwide movement for equality of sex and gender minorities.   38
 Gay rights movements in the global South are equally legitimate to their Western 
counterparts, therefore social scientists should not be weary of having a “Western bias” 
when it comes to homosexuality in foreign cultures. Foreign gay rights movements 
should be included in social movement research. The geneses of these movements is 
 This does not imply that there is a lack of diversity from a linguistic standpoint since each language has 38
its own unique politically correct term(s) to describe gays and lesbians, such as “kuchu” in Uganda, or 
“mithli” and “mithliyya” for gay men and women in several MENA states (Whitaker 2006, 14), although 
this does vary. Nonetheless, most gay and trans Arab activists observed throughout the duration of this 
study self-identify with the ‘LGBTQ’ moniker, but cultural relativists still deny the universalization of 
LGBTQ rights.
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transpiring at this very moment. Studying them will provide insight into how 
controversial causes evolve into movements in the era of technology. 
Conclusion 
 The internet should be scrupulously examined in authoritarian regimes across the 
globe in order to develop insight into other potential ways activists are utilizing it to 
pressure governments and push their causes. As access to the internet increases, so too 
will the size of these movements. Though the scope of this study is limited to three case 
studies, the applicability of the internet mobilization hypothesis is not restricted to 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, nor the aggregate MENA region. Colombant (2010) 
reports that LGBTQ activists in many Sub-Saharan African countries are also employing 
online strategies to combat social and legal discrimination. This is evident in Uganda, but 
is also applicable to the Russian LGBTQ movement as well. For this reason, I believe my 
methodology will prove useful for assessing what catalyzes these movements and what 
determines their overall strength in other authoritarian states throughout the world. 
 The political implications of the internet mobilization hypothesis may even extend 
beyond LGBTQ movements. It may also prove useful for other types of controversial 
movements for postmaterialist causes such as atheist, agnostic, areligious, anti-theist, and 
deist (AAAAD) movements seeing as how they are equally vilified, especially in 
Muslim-majority MENA states, thus making the internet a necessity for mobilization of 
their community as well. Social movements that would otherwise not exist could soon be 
materializing due to the internet.   
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 All types of activists—both material and postmaterial—have used the internet to 
facilitate collective action and pressure regimes. Various types of episodic movements 
around the globe have also been instigated online, including small-scale anti-military 
protests in Russia to large-scale revolutions which lead to the ousting of dictatorial 
leaders in the Arab spring (Lonkila 2008; Lynch 2012; Lust 2013). Implications of the 
internet on culture, religion, and governance can only be speculated, but its impact on 
social movements is evident. 
 The aim of this graduate thesis is to ultimately understand why gay rights 
movements exist in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. Although 
the MENA is heterogenous, citizens of states in this region are rational actors that are no 
less likely than anyone else to aspire to attain freedom and equality in society. One’s 
decision to engage in a pursuit to impact public policy will not ensue unless the proper 
conditions—namely, adequate access to the internet—are sufficient since it is not 
pragmatic for advocates of controversial causes to engage in activism without anonymity.  
 The notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’	  is faulty with respect to gay activism and 
does not hold much weight in an era of globalization and expanded access to new 
technology. Although there are cultural, religious, and linguistic differences with respect 
to sexual orientation and gender identity, the inclination of cultural relativists to peg 
emerging postmaterialist causes as Western phenomena is not grounded in logic, nor is it 
empirically or factually verifiable. Instead, these movements have been delayed in the 
MENA not because homosexuality does not exist there, or because they want to emulate 
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the West, but because they have not had access to a viable political resource—the internet
—until recently. This argument strengthens resource mobilization theory and emphasizes 
the importance of political opportunities in the emergence of new social movements.  
 Like-minded individuals are coming together throughout the region to improve 
their social status and stake their claim in politics. LGBTQ activism in the Middle East 
and North Africa is not going anywhere, but the question rather is how much momentum 
these movements will gain in the near future considering how big they have become 
given the short period of time for which they have existed. Political scientists contend 
that the Arab uprising, an extraordinary political phenomenon, transpired due to access to 
new technology (Lust 2013; Lynch 2012; Hussain & Howard 2013). The internet was 
cited as a key tool for Arab activists seeing that it was useful for mass political 
mobilization in 2011 (Lust 2013, 283). This graduate thesis demonstrates that the internet 
can catalyze other types of activism as well: gay and transgender equality movements. 
The political landscape in the Middle East and North Africa will likely continue to 
transform due to the increasing prominence of the internet.  
!104
References 
Abedine, Saad and Elizabeth Landau. 2014. “Ugandan Tabloid Prints List of 
 ‘Homosexuals'.” CNN. 25 February, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 24 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/25/world/africa/uganda-anti-gay-law/>. 
Abu Nawas. “About Us! A Rebrique for us Connetr.” Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://abunawas-algerie.e-monsite.com/pages/qui-sommes-nous-une-rebrique- 
 pour-nous-connetre.html>. 
Achi, George. 2009. “Peaceful Rally in Beirut for Gay Rights.” Monthly Review. 23  
 February, 2009. Web. (Accessed: 27 March, 2015).  
 <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2009/achi230209.html>. 
Afrol News. 2010. “Algerian Gays Lit Candles for Recognition.” 13 October, 2010. Web. 
 (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.afrol.com/articles/36770>. 
Al Arabiya News. 2013. “Lawyer: Two Moroccans Jailed for Homosexuality.” 21 May,  
 2013. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/05/21/Lawyer-Two- 
 Moroccans-jailed-for-homosexuality-.html>. 
———. 2014. “Tunisian Police Disperse Islamic Protestors.” 12 April, 2014. Web.  
 (Accessed: 6 May, 2015). 
 <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/04/12/Calm-returns-after-Tunisian- 
 Salafist-protest.html>. 
!105
Alexa. 2015a. “Top Sites in Morocco.” Alexa Internet, Incorporated. Web. (Accessed: 8  
 May, 2015).  
 <http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/MA>. 
———. 2015b. “Top Sites in Algeria.” Alexa Internet, Incorporated. Web. (Accessed: 8  
 May, 2015). 
 <http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries;0/DZ>. 
Alizadeh, Hossein. 2014. “When Coming Out Is a Death Sentence: The Rising Tide of  
 Violence Against LGBT Iraqis.” The Huffington Post. 26 November, 2014. Web.  
 (Accessed: 20 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hossein-alizadeh/when-coming-out-is-a-  
 deat_b_6201210.html>. 
Al Jazeera. 2013. “Salafist Group Clashes With Police in Tunisia.” 20 May, 2013. Web.  
 (Accessed: 6 May, 2015). 
 <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/05/20135198155650292.html>. 
Amand, Jason. 2012. “Lebanese LGBT Group Protests Against Gay Anal Testing.” Edge  
 Media  Network. 16 August, 2012. Web. (Accessed: 27 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.edgeboston.com/news/international/news/136092/lebanese_lgbt_gro 
 up_protests_against_gay_anal_testing>. 
Association Alouen. “Our Mission.” Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://alouen.org/notre-mission/>. 
!106
———. 2011. “Kif-Kif: Une Association Qui a Su Briser les Tabous.” 10 October, 2011. 
  Web. (Accessed: 7 May, 2015).  
 <http://alouen.org/kif-kif-une-association-qui-a-su-briser-les-tabous/>. 
Bancroft, John. 2002. “Biological Factors in Human Sexuality.” The Journal of Sex  
 Research 39 (1): 15-21. 
Bayat, Asef. 2000. “Social Movements, Activism and Social Development in the Middle  
 East.” United Nations. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development,  
 Programme Paper Number 3. Web. (Accessed: 6 May, 2015).  
 <http://www.unrisd.org/80256b3c005bccf9/(httpauxpages)/9c2befd0ee1c73b380 
 256b5e004ce4c3/$file/bayat.pdf>. 
———. 2002. “Activism and Social Development in the Middle East.” International  
 Journal of Middle East Studies 34 (1): 1-28. 
———. 2005. “Islamism and Social Movement Theory.” Third World Quarterly 26 (6):  
 891-908. 
BBC. 2014. “Where is it illegal to be gay?.” BBC News. 10 February, 2014. Web.   
 (Accessed: 20 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-25927595>. 
Belonksy, Andrew. 2008. “Moroccan Paper Fined for ‘Sexual Perversion’ Smear.”  
 Queerty. 25 March, 2008. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.queerty.com/moroccan-paper-fined-for-sexual-perversion-  
 smear-20080325 >. 
!107
Belson, David. 2014. “State of the Internet.” Akamai 7(4): 1-62. Web. (Accessed: 7 May, 
 2015). 
 <http://www.akamai.com/dl/content/q4-2014-soti-report.pdf>. 
Bergen, Peter and Alec Reynolds. 2005. “Blowback Revisited: Today’s Insurgents in Iraq 
 Are Tomorrow’s Terrorists.”	  Foreign Affairs 84 (6): 2-6.  
Blackshaw, Anna. 2012. “After the Arab Spring, the Future is Uncertain for Muslim Gay  
 Youth.” Indy Week. 19 September, 2012. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/after-the-arab-spring-the-future-is-  
 uncertain-for-muslim-gay-youth/Content?oid=3152028>. 
Blanchard, Ray. 2000. “Fraternal Birth Order, Maternal Immune Reactions, and   
 Homosexuality in Men.”	  Politics and the Life Sciences 19 (2): 157-159. 
Boudjadi, Kamel. 2010. “Gay Imam Gets Two-Year Jail Sentence in Algeria.” San Diego 
 Gay & Lesbian News. 14 April, 2010. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.sdgln.com/news/2010/04/14/gay-imam-gets-two-year-jail-sentence- 
 algeria#sthash.n7CKHr9h.dpbs>. 
Bradley, John. 2010. Behind the Veil of Vice: The Business and Culture of Sex in the  
 Middle East. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Buechler, Steven. 1995. “New Social Movement Theories.”	  The Sociological Quarterly  
 36 (3): 441-464. 
Canning, Paul. 2011. “Tunisian Islamists Offer Reassurance to Gays, Women, Drinkers.”	  	   Care2. 25 October, 2011. Web. (Accessed: 24 March 2015). 
!108
 <http://www.care2.com/causes/tunisian-islamists-offer-reassurance-to-gays- 
 women-drinkers.html>. 
Charrad, Mounira. 2001. States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial   
 Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
CIA World Factbook. 2014a. “Country Comparison: Internet Users.” United States.  
 Central Intelligence Agency. Web. (Accessed: 24 March, 2015). 
 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/  
 2153rank.html>. 
———. 2014b. “Country Comparison: Population.” United States. Central   
 Intelligence Agency. Web. (Accessed: 24 March, 2015). 
 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/  
 2119rank.html>. 
———. 2014c. “Country Comparison: HIV/AIDS - Adult Prevalence Rate.” United  
 States. Central Intelligence Agency. Web. (Accessed: 24 March, 2015). 
 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/  
 2155rank.html>. 
______. 2014d. “Africa: Algeria.” United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Web.  
 (Accessed: 7 May, 2015). 
 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html>. 
!109
Cohen, Dudi. 2011. “Gay Community in Iran Launches Facebook Campaign Against  
 Regime that Views Their Sexual Identity a Crime Punishable by Death.” Y Net  
 News. 12 September, 2011. Web. (Accessed: 28 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4121043,00.html>. 
Colombant, Nico. 2010. “Africa’s Gay Activists Use Internet to Advance Homosexual  
 Rights.” Voice of America. 14 June, 2010. Web. (Accessed: 8 May, 2015). 
  <http://www.voanews.com/content/africas-gay-activists-use-internet-to-advance- 
 homosexual-rights—96381899/154893.html>. 
Dahl, Robert. 1971. Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale   
 University Press. 
______1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Damon, Arwa and Zeynep Bilginsoy. 2015. “Amid Brazen, Deadly Attacks, Gay Syrians  
 Tell of Fear of ISIS Persecution.”	  CNN. 6 March, 2015. Web. (Accessed: 20  
 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/05/middleeast/isis-lgbt-persecution/>. 
Davies, James. 1962. “Toward a Theory of Revolution.”	  American Sociological Review  
 27 (1): 5-19. 
Dehghan, Saeed. 2012. “Iran’s Persecution of Gay Community Revealed.” The Guardian. 
 17 May, 2012. Web. (Accessed: 28 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/17/iran-persecution-gay-commun 
 ity-revealed>. 
!110
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.. 2008. “Postmaterialism.” Dictionary.com. Web.   
 (Accessed: 16 March, 2015). 
 <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/postmaterialism>. 
eMarketer. 2013. “Smartphone Usage to Nearly Double in the Middle East and Africa.” 1 
 October, 2013. Web. (Accessed: 7 May, 2015). 
 <http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Smartphone-Usage-Nearly-Double-Middle- 
 East-Africa/1010249>. 
Eremenko, Alexey. 2013. “Iranian Atheists: Waiting to Come Out.” Sputnik. 19 March,  
 2013. Web. (Accessed: 28 March, 2015).  
 <http://sputniknews.com/analysis/20130319/180108603.html>. 
Falk, Pamela. 2014. “LGBT rights 45 years after the Stonewall riots.” CBS News. 27  
 June, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 23 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lgbt-rights-45-years-after-the-stonewall-riots/>. 
Feder, J. Lester. 2014. “LGBT Egyptians Go Into Hiding As Regime Cracks Down.” !
! Buzzfeed. 23 September, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 29 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/why-egypts-regime-has-launched-a-mass- 
 crackdown-on-lgbt-righ#.rpvnJ1bkb>. 
Fisher, Max. 2012. “Photos of Clandestine Gay Rights Rally in Tehran.” The Atlantic. 22 
 May, 2012. Web. (Accessed: 28 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/photos-of-a-clandestin 
 e-gay-rights-rally-in-tehran/257500/#slide9>. 
!111
Freedom House. 2005. “Freedom in the World: Morocco.” Web. (Accessed: 8 May,  
 2015).  
 <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/morocco#.VUwz0b64ldg>. 
———. 2011. “Freedom on the Net: Tunisia.” Web. (Accessed: 8 May, 2015). 
 <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2011/tunisia#.VT_kar64ldg>. 
———. 2013. “Freedom in the World: Algeria.” Web. (Accessed: 8 May, 2015). 
 <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/algeria#.VUw4dr64ldg>. 
———. 2014. “Freedom on the Net.” Web. (Accessed: 8 May, 2015). 
 <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2014#.VT_jvb64ldi>. 
———. 2015. “Freedom in the World 2015.” Web. (Accessed: 6 May, 2015). 
 <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.VRTs1L 
 64ldg>. 
Gavrilets, Sergey and William Rice. 2009. “Genetic Models of Homosexuality:   
 Generating Testable Predictions.” Proceedings: Biological Sciences 273 (1605):  
 3031-3038. 
Gettleman, Jeffrey. 2011. “Ugandan Who Spoke Up for Gays Is Beaten to Death.” The  
 New York Times. 21 January, 2011. Web. (Accessed: 23 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/africa/28uganda.html?_r=0>. 
Ghanmi, Lamine. 2010. “Morocco Resists Islamist Calls to Ban Elton John.” Reuters. 17 
 May, 2010. Web. (Accessed: 24 March, 2015). 
!112
 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/17/us-eltonjohn-    
 idUSTRE64G5DV20100517>. 
Goodman, Melvin. 2013. “The Blowback from Interventionism.” Consortium News. 27  
 April, 2013. Web. (Accessed: 23 March, 2015). 
 <https://consortiumnews.com/2013/04/27/the-blowback-from-interventionism/>. 
Gray, Stephen. 2012. “Casablanca: Gay Cruise Diverted.” Pink News. 2 July, 2012. Web. 
 (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2012/07/02/casablanca-gay-cruise-diverted/>. 
Grew, Tony. 2008. “Moroccan Newspaper Sued by Judges Over Gay Party Story.” Pink  
 News. 26 March, 2008. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2008).  
 <http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2008/03/26/moroccan-newspaper-sued-by-judges- 
 over-gay-party-story/>. 
GSMA. 2014. “The Mobile Economy: Arab States 2014.” Groupe Speciale Mobile  
 Association. Web. (Accessed: 7 May, 2015). 
 <http://arabstates.gsmamobileeconomy.com/GSMA_ME_Arab_States_2014.p 
 df>. 
Hafften, Marie. 2012. “Lesbians in Morocco: Should We Stay or Should We Go?” Global 
 Post. 22 June, 2012. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/morocco/120621/ 
 morocco-LGBT-gay-lesbian>. 
!113
Harim, O. 2014. “Behind the Scenes With Algeria’s First LGBT Magazine. The   
 Observers. 12 March, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 26 March, 2015).  
 <http://observers.france24.com/content/20141203-algeria-first-lgbt-magazine- 
 gay>. 
Harit, Fouad. 2013. “Maroc: Une Cyber-Campagne Contre L’Homophobie.” Afrik. 17  
 May, 2013. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.afrik.com/maroc-une-cyber-campagne-contre-l-homophobie>. 
Hassan Al-Ashraf, Rabat. 2009. “Gay Seminar Stirs Outrage in Morocco.” Al Arabiya  
 News. 19 March, 2009. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015). 
  <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/03/19/68776.html>. 
Hayoun, Massoud. 2014a. “Morocco Convicts Six Men for Homosexuality.” Al Jazeera  
 America. 15 May, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/15/morocco-convicts6menforhomos 
 exualityamidnationaldialogueongays.html>. 
———. 2014b. “Moroccans’ Gay Pride March Aims to Carve Out New Space From a  
 Distance.” Al Jazeera America. 26 June, 2015. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015). 
 <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/26/morocco-gay-pride0.html>. 
Helem. 2014. “About Us.” Web. (Accessed: 31 March, 2015).  
 <http://helem.net/?q=node/59>. 
Hopkins, Curt. 2012. “Tunisia Promises to End Internet Censorship.” The Daily Dot. 14  
 September, 2012. Web. (Accessed: 8 May, 2015).  
!114
 <http://www.dailydot.com/news/tunisia-internet-censorship/>. 
Hubbard, Ben. 2015. “Caning of Saudi Blogger is Delayed Amid Protests.” The New York 
 Times. 16 January, 2015. Web. (Accessed: 16 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/world/caning-of-saudi-blogger-is-delayed- 
 amid-protests.html?_r=0>. 
Huffington Post. 2015. “Tunisia’s New Gay Rights Fight.” 13 March, 2015. Web.   
 (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/11/tunisia-gay-rights_n_6304872 
 .html>. 
Hussain, Muzammil and Philip Howard. 2013. “What Best Explains Successful Protest  
 Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring.”	  International Studies  
 Review 15 (1): 48-66. 
Index on Censorship. 2005. “Dossier on Morocco.” Index on Censorship 34 (3): 154-165. 
Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles  
 Among Western Publics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
———. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, New Jersey:  
 Princeton University Press. 
Internet World Stats. 2012a. “Morocco: Internet Usage and Marketing Report.” Web.  
 (Accessed: 7 May, 2015). 
 <http://www.internetworldstats.com/af/ma.htm>. 
———. 2012b. “Algeria: Internet Usage and Marketing Report.” Web. (Accessed: 7  
!115
 May, 2015). 
 <http://www.internetworldstats.com/af/dz.htm>. 
———. 2012c. “Tunisia: Internet Usage and Marketing Report.” Web. (Accessed: 7 May, 
 2015). 
 <http://www.internetworldstats.com/af/tn.htm>. 
———. 2014. “Internet Usage Statistics for Africa.”	  Web. (Accessed: 26 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm>. 
Iranian Queer Organization. 2015a. “Our Story.” Web. (Accessed: 28 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.irqo.org/english/?page_id=389>. 
Itaborahy, Lucas and Jingshu Zhu. 2014. “State-Sponsored Homophobia: A World Survey 
 of Laws: Criminalisation, Protection and Recognition of Same-Sex Love.”	  	  	   International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association. Web.   
 (Accessed: 20 March, 2015). 
 <http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_SSHR_2014_Eng.pdf>. 
Iyengar, Shanto, Mark D. Peters, and Donald R. Kinder. 1993. “Experimental   
 Demonstrations of the ‘Not-So-Minimal’	  Consequences of Television News  
 Program.”	  In Experimental Foundations of Political Science. Eds. Donald R  
 Kinder and Thomas R. Palfrey. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press. 
Jasper, James. 1997. The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in  
 Social Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
!116
Jean-Jacques, Sarah. 2014. “Gay & Lesbian Mobilization in Algeria: The Emergence of a 
 Movement.” Muftah. 15 December, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2014).  
 <http://muftah.org/gay-and-lesbian-mobilization-in-algeria/#.VRM19b64ldg>. 
Joffé, George. 2014. “To Reign or Rule: Morocco’s Halting Road to Liberalization.”  
 World Politics Review. 22 April, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 7 May, 2015).  
 <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13719/to-reign-or-rule-morocco-s- 
 halting-road-to-liberalization>. 
Karimi, Faith and Nick Thompson. 2014. “Uganda's President Museveni Signs   
 Controversial Anti-Gay Bill into Law.”	  CNN. 25 February, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 
 23 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/24/world/africa/uganda-anti-gay-bill/>. 
Kelmty - Associations Gays et Lesbiennes Tunisiens. 2015. Facebook. Web. 
 (Accessed: 24 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.facebook.com/kelmty>. 
Kingsley, Patrick. 2014. “Egypt Jails Eight Men After ‘Gay Marriage’	  Ceremony on  
 Nile.”	  The Guardian. 3 November, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 16 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/03/egypt-jails-eight-men-gay-	  	   marriage-ceremony-nile>. 
Kuhanen, Jan. 2008. “The Historiography of HIV and AIDS in Uganda.”	  History in  
 Africa 35: 301-325. 
!117
Lee, Ian, and Sarah Sirgany. 2015. “Living in Fear: Egypt’s Gay Community.” CNN. 2  
 January, 2015. Web. (Accessed: 29 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/09/world/africa/egypts-gay-community-living-in- 
 fear/>. 
Lee, Timothy. 2013. “Here’s How Iran Censors the Internet.” The Washington Post. 15  
 August, 2013. Web. (Accessed: 28 March, 2015)  
 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/15/heres-how- 
 iran-censors-the-internet/>. 
Littauer, Dan. 2012. “Tunisian Human Rights Minister: No Free Speech for Gays.”	  Pink  
 News. 6 February, 2012. Web. (Accessed: 24 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2012/02/06/tunisian-human-rights-minister-no-free- 
 speech-for-gays/>. 
———. 2013. “Lebanon: Activists Protest Against Arrest and Abuse of Gays.” Gay  
 Star News. 1 May, 2013. Web. (Accessed: 27 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/lebanon-activists-protest-against-arrest-and- 
 abuse-gays010513>. 
———. 2014. “Lebanon Launches Police Raids Targeting Gay Men.” San Diego Gay &  
 Lesbian News. 15 August, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 27 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.sdgln.com/news/2014/08/15/lebanon-launches-police-raids-targeting 
 -gay-men#sthash.GuXXx5su.dpbs>. 
Lonkila, Markku. 2008. “The Internet and Anti-Military Activism in Russia.”	  Europe- 
!118
 Asia Studies 60 (7): 1125-1149. 
Lucas, Michael. 2012. “Gays In The New, Complicated Tunisia.” Advocate. 4 December, 
 2012. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2012/12/04/gays-new-and-complicated- 
 tunisia>. 
Lust, Ellen. 2013. The Middle East. 13th ed. Thousand Oaks, California: CQ Press. 
Lutterback, Derek. 2013. “Tunisia After Ben Ali: Retooling the Tools of Oppression?”  
 Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. Web. (Accessed: 6 May, 2015). 
 <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/8a4a0 
 1231edc1bc44e19af1182314d46.pdf>. 
Lynch, Mark. 2012. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle  
 East. 1st ed. New York: Public Affairs. 
Marks, Gary. 2009. “Modernization Theory and Changes Over Time in the Reproduction 
 of Socioeconomic Inequalities in Australia.” Social Forces 88 (2): 917-944. 
Marzouki, Nadia. 2010. “Algeria”	  in Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North  
 Africa: Progress Amid Resistance. Eds. Sanja Kelly and Julia Breslin. Lanham,  
 MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Masriya, Aswat. 2014. “Egypt’s Homosexuals Struggle for Freedom.” Egyptian Streets. 8 
 April, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 29 March, 2015).  
 <http://egyptianstreets.com/2014/04/08/egypts-homosexuals-struggle-for-freed 
 om/>. 
!119
McCarthy, John and Mayer Zald. 1977. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:  
 A Partial Theory.”	  American Journal of Sociology 82 (6): 1212-1241. 
McCarthy, Justin. 2014. “Nearly 3 in 10 Worldwide See Their Areas as Good for Gays.”	  	  	   Gallup. 27 August, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 20 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/175520/nearly-worldwide-areas-good-gays.aspx>. 
McCombs, Maxwell. 2004. Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion.  
 Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Mekhennet, Souad, and Maïa de la Baume. 2011. “Moderate Islamist Party Winning  
 Morocco Election.” New York Times. 26 November, 2011. Web. (Accessed: 7  
 May, 2015). 
 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/world/africa/moderate-islamist-party- 
 winning-morocco-election.html?_r=0>. 
Melucci, Alberto. 1996. Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age.  
 New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Merrill, Jamie. 2015. “Gay Rights Activists Defy Ugandan Laws by Publishing New  
 LGBTI Magazine.”	  4 January, 2010. Web. (Accessed: 23 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/gay-rights-activists-defy- 
 ugandan-laws-by-publishing-new-lgbti-magazine-9955950.html>. 
Miles, Matthew. 2013. “The Bully Pulpit and Media Coverage: Power Without   
 Persuasion.”	  The International Journal of Press/Politics 19 (1): 66-84. 
!120
Morgan, Joe. 2015. “Swedish Gay Man Jailed in Tunisia for ‘Homosexual Acts’.” Gay  
 Star News. 8 February, 2015. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/swedish-gay-man-jailed-tunisia-homosexu 
 al-acts080215>. 
Muhumuza, Rodney. 2014. “Uganda's Gay Community Celebrates Pride After Anti- 
 LGBT Law Invalidated.”	  The Huffington Post. 11 August, 2014. Web. (Accessed:  
 23 March, 2013). 
 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/11/uganda-gay-pride-parade-  
 _n_5668148.html>. 
Mumtaz, Ghina, Nahla Hilmi, Willi McFarland, Rachel Kaplan, Francisca Ayodeji, Iris  
 Semini, Gabriele Riedner, Oussama Tawil, David Wilson, and Laith Abu-Raddad.  
 2011. “Are HIV Epidemics Among Men Who Have Sex with Men Emerging in  
 the Middle East and North Africa?: A Systematic Review and Data   
 Synthesis.”PLoS Medicine 8 (8): 1-15. 
Murphy, Timothy. 2005. “The Search For The Gay Gene.’	  BMJ: British Medical Journal 
 330 (7498): 1033. 
Naar, Ismaeel. 2013. “Shifting Gear: Saudi Women Defy Driving Ban.” Al Jazeera. 27  
 October, 2013. Web. (Accessed: 27 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/10/shifting-gear-saudi-women- 
 defy-driving-ban-20131027132853713829.html>. 
Oldershausen, Sasha. 2012. “Iran's Sex-Change Operations Provided Nearly Free-Of- 
!121
 Cost.”	  4 June, 2012. Web. (Accessed: 20 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/04/iran-sex-change-   
 operation_n_1568604.html>. 
Online Maps. 2012. “Africa Population Density.” 23 September, 2013. Web. (Accessed:  
 7 May, 2015). 
 <http://onlinemaps.blogspot.com/2012/09/africa-population-density.html>.  
OpenNet Initiative. 2009a. “Algeria.” Web. (Accessed: 8 May, 2015).  
 <https://opennet.net/research/profiles/algeria>. 
———. 2009b. “Morocco.” Web. (Accessed: 8 May, 2015). 
 <https://opennet.net/research/profiles/morocco>. 
O’Riordan, Kate. 2012. “The Life of the Gay Gene: From Hypothetical Genetic Marker  
 to Social Reality.”	  The Journal of Sex Research 49 (4): 362-368. 
Overseas Security Advisory Council. 2014. “Morocco 2014 Crime and Safety Report.” !
! United States. Department of State. Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 10 February,  
 2014. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15123>. 
Palau, Anna and Ferran Davesa. 2013. “The Impact of Media Coverage of Corruption on     
______Spanish Public Opinion.”	  Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 144:  
 97-124. 
Penketh, Anne. 2008. ”Brutal land where homosexuality is punishable by death." 
The Independent. 6 March, 2008. Web. (Accessed: 26 March, 2014).  
!122
 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/brutal-land-
where-homosexuality-is-punishable-by-death-792057.html>. 
Pew Research Center. 2013. “The Global Divide on Homosexuality: Greater Acceptance  
 in More Secular and Affluent Countries.”	  Pew Research Center. 4 June, 2013.  
 Web. (Accessed: 20 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/>. 
Pfeiffer, Tom and Zakia Abdennebi. 2008. “Liberals and Islamists Clash Over Morocco 
 ‘Gay Wedding’.” Reuters. 13 March, 2008. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/03/13/uk-rights-morocco-   
 idUKL0581448520080313>. 
Pink News. 2007. “Home Office Loses Gay Algerian Deportation Case.” 24 October,  
 2007. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2007/10/24/home-office-loses-gay-algerian-  
 deportation-case/>. 
Polity IV. 2010. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Algeria.” Web. (Accessed: 8 May,  
 2015).  
 <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Algeria2010.pdf>. 
———. 2014a. “Authority Trends, 1962-2013: Algeria.” Web. (Accessed: 26 March,  
 2015). 
 <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/alg2.htm>. 
!123
———. 2014b. “Authority Trends, 1956-2013: Morocco.” Web. (Accessed: 26 March,  
 2015). 
 <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/mor2.htm>. 
———. 2014c. “Authority Trends, 1959-2013: Tunisia.” Web. (Accessed: 26 March,  
 2015). 
 <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/tun2.htm>. 
Putnam, Robert. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level  
 Games.”	  International Organization 42 (3): 427-460. 
Ramdani, Nahila. 2011. “Algeria Tried to Block Internet and Facebook as Protest   
 Mounted.”	  12 February, 2011. Web. (Accessed: 24 March, 2015). 
  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/algeria/ 
 8320772/Algeria-tried-to-block-internet-and-Facebook-as-protest-mounted.html>. 
Rawlinson, Kevin. 2014. “British Man Jailed for Four Months in Morocco ‘For Being  
 Gays’.” The Guardian. 5 October, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/06/british-man-ray-cole-70-jailed- 
 four-months-morocco-gay>. 
Reger, Jo and Kimberly Dugan. 2001. “Exploring Social Movement Theories Through an 
 Interactive Exercise.”	  Teaching Sociology 29 (3): 332-342. 
Rhanem, Karima. 2006. “Sex Scandal: Gay Porn Network Sentenced to 30 Years in  
 Prison.” Morocco Times. 6 March, 2006. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
!124
 <http://karimarhanem.skyrock.com/2167919511-Sex-Scandal-Gay-porn-network- 
 sentenced-to-30-years-in-prison.html>. 
Roberts, Matthew. 1995. “The Emergence of Gay Identity and Social Movements in  
 Developing Countries: The AIDs Crisis as Catalyst.”	  Alternatives: Global, Local,  
 Political 20 (2): 243-248. 
Roberts, Scott. 2015. “Morocco Jails 2 Men for Committing a ‘Deviant Sexual Act’.” !
! Pink News. 5 March, 2015. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2015/03/05/morocco-jails-2-men-for-committing-a- 
 deviant-sexual-act/>. 
Salhi, Zahia. 2010. “Algerian Women, Citizenship, and the ‘Family Code’.”	  Gender &  
 Development 11 (3): 27-35. 
Schedler, Andreas. 2002. “The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2):  
 36-50. 
Schweiger, Laura. 2011. “EU Asylum Policy for Gays and Lesbians Criticized by LGBT  
 Groups.” Deutsche Welle. 19 May, 2011. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.dw.de/eu-asylum-policy-for-gays-and-lesbians-criticized-by-lgbt- 
 groups/a-15089739>. 
Sheils, Conor. 2014. “Egypt’s Gay Activists are Ready to Fightback.” Cairo Scene. 28  
 September, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 29 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.cairoscene.com/ViewArticle.aspx?AId=14210-Egypt's-Gay-Activist 
 s-Are-Ready-To-Fightback>. 
!125
Schumpeter, Joseph. 1950. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. 
Sidiguitiebe, Christophe. 2014. ”L’homosexualité au Maroc Devient-elle Moins Tabou?” 
 Telquel. 16 May, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://telquel.ma/2014/05/16/lhomosexualite-au-maroc-devient-elle-moins- 
 tabou_136020>. 
Sieczkowski, Cavan. 2014. “Sochi Mayor Says There Are No Gay People In His 
City.” The Huffington Post. 27 January, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 26 
March, 2014). 
 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/27/sochi-mayor-no-gay-
people_n_4673232.html>. 
Similar Web. 2014. “Website Ranking: Top 50 Sites in Tunisia for All Categories.” Web.  
 (Accessed: 8 May, 2015).  
 <http://www.similarweb.com/country/tunisia>. 
Slimane. 2010. “Being Gay in Algeria Today.” Global Gayz. 13 January, 2013. Web.  
 (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.globalgayz.com/being-gay-in-algeria-today/391/ >. 
Smith, David. 2010. “Gay Magazine Launched in Morocco.”	  The Guardian. 20 May,  
 2010. Web. (Accessed: 24 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/20/gay-magazine-launch-  
 morocco-rights>. 
!126
Stern, Jason. 2014. “Saudi Arabia Steps Up Censorship, Snaring Activists.” The   
 Huffington Post. 27 May, 2014. Web. (Accessed: 27 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/committee-to-protect-journalists/saudi-arabia- 
 steps-up-cen_b_5398145.html>. 
Sufian, Sandy. 2004. “HIV/AIDs in the Middle East and North Africa: A Primer.”	  Middle 
 East Report (233): 6-9. 
Tait, Robert. 2005. “A Fatwa for Freedom.” The Guardian. 27 July, 2015. Web.   
 (Accessed: 28 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jul/27/gayrights.iran>. 
Tammen, Ronald, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan Stam III, Carole Alsharabati,  
 Mark Abdollahian, Brian Efird, and A.F.K. Organski. 2000. Power Transitions:  
 Strategies for the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
Tarrow, Sidney. 2011. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics.  
 New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 
TGEU. 2012. “816 Reported Cases of Murdered Trans People Between January 2008 and 
 December 2011.”	  Transgender Europe. Web. (Accessed: 20 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.transrespect-transphobia.org/uploads/images/maps/TvT-TMM- 
 Map2008-11-en2.png>. 
———. 2014a. “Legal and Social Mapping - World #1.”	  Transgender Europe. Web.  
 (Accessed: 20 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.transrespect-transphobia.org/uploads/downloads/Legal-Social- 
!127
 Mapping2014/web_tvt_mapping_1_EN.pdf>. 
———. 2014b. “Legal and Social Mapping - World #2.”	  Transgender Europe. Web.  
 (Accessed: 20 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.transrespect-transphobia.org/uploads/downloads/Legal-Social- 
 Mapping2014/web_tvt_mapping_2_EN.pdf>. 
Tilly, Charles. 2004. Social Movements, 1768-2004. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. 
Torbey, Carine. 2005. “Lebanon’s Gays Struggle With Law.” BBC News. 29 August,  
 2005. Web. (Accessed: 6 May, 2015). 
 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4154664.stm>. 
Tutton, Mark. 2010. “Algerian Transsexual’s Memoirs Reveal Life of Discrimination.” !
! CNN. 9 July, 2010. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/07/09/randa.algeria.transsexu 
 al.lebanon/>.  
UNHCR. 2007. “Algeria: Treatment of Homosexuals by Society and Government  
 Authorities; Protection Available Including Recourse to the Law for Homosexuals 
 Who Have Been Subject to Ill-Treatment (2005-2007).” United Nations. United  
 Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 30 July, 2007. Web. (Accessed: 25  
 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain? page=country&category 
 =&publisher=IRBC&type=&coi=DZA&rid=&docid=474e895c1e&skip=0>. 
!128
U.S. Department of State. 2013. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013:  
 Morocco.” United States. Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human  
 Rights and Labor. Web. (Accessed: 25 March, 2015).  
 <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?   
 year=2013&dlid=220369>. 
Watan, Cherfaoui. 2004. “Bouteflika Favorable à	  la Révision du Code de la Famille.”	  	  	   Algerie-DZ. 11 October, 2004. Web. (Accessed: 24 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.algerie-dz.com/article1172.html>. 
Whitaker, Brian. 2006. Unspeakable Love: Gay and Lesbian Life in the Middle East. Los 
 Angeles, California: University of California Press. 
Wong, Curtis. 2014. “Ricky Martin Changes 'She' To 'He' During Performance Of 'She's  
 All I Ever Had' In Morocco.”	  The Huffington Post. 16 June, 2014. Web.   
 (Accessed: 24 March, 2015). 
 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/16/ricky-martin-pronoun-  
 song_n_5499402.html>. 
World Values Survey. 2010-2014. “Online Data Analysis.”	  Web. (Accessed: 16 March,  
 2014). 
 <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp>. 
Yes People! We Do Exist! 2015. Facebook. Web. (Accessed: 28 March, 2015).  
 <https://www.facebook.com/IranianLGBTcommunity>. 
!129
Zarindast, Karen, and Saeedeh Hashemi. 2012. “Iran’s Health Insurers to Pay for Sex  
 Change Operations.” BBC News. 29 May, 2012. Web. (Accessed: 28 March,  
 2015)   
 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18258276>.
